

**Results Review and Resource Request**

**Fiscal Year 2000**

**United States Agency for International Development  
Bureau for Humanitarian Response**

**Office of Food for Peace - Strategic Objective #1  
"Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met"**

**27 APRIL 1998**

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*“All beneficiaries interviewed expressed their deep appreciation to the American people for the gift of food during a time of great need and asked that this message be shared with others.”*

*USAID Monitoring Report, Emergency Food Program, Bulgaria, January 1998*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Results Review and Resource Request (R4) for fiscal year 2000 demonstrates the achievements of the Office of Food for Peace Strategic Objective 1 (SO1) team and its implementing partners, U.S. PVOs and international organizations, principally the World Food Program (WFP), and host country governments. Accomplishments are illustrated by case studies and lessons learned in delivering humanitarian assistance, often in difficult and dangerous situations. Results have been achieved with *extraordinary* effort by the SO1 team and its partners during the reporting year to incorporate management-for-results principles into its emergency food aid programs. Besides leading field workshops on performance measurement, the SO1 team was instrumental in initiating the Humanitarian Assistance Working Group, resulting in improved dialogue among USAID offices, other donors, and implementing partners dealing with humanitarian assistance.

The SO1 team is committed to the R4 process and sees it as a useful management tool to monitor performance in emergency food aid. Because of this process, the factors affecting program performance have become very clear. Critical to improving performance is the *urgent need for staff resources with which to deliver emergency food aid*. U.S. Title II emergency food aid is a \$404 million annual investment. The majority of SO1 programs address complex emergencies which require intensive coordination and consultations.

Indicators related to internal management performance are responsive to the availability of resources. The overall results illustrate that the main problem in emergency food aid programming is internal. In spite of efforts made to develop new innovative approaches to meet urgent food needs, the problem remains. The underlying cause, that is, insufficient staff resources with which to meet urgent food needs, must be addressed, especially as USAID continues to reduce its field presence.

The effects of not addressing this problem may be increased vulnerabilities of USAID to complaints and IG audits and investigations. The Office of Food for Peace and SO1 will realistically adjust its results to resource availabilities. Increased responsiveness to food aid requests will reduce SO1's capacity to report on results. This will most likely increase USAID's vulnerability to criticisms from implementing partners, donors, international agencies, and Congress.

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27 April 1998

### PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

## **Background**

Enacted in 1954, Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, was a landmark piece of legislation. It represented one of the first permanent peacetime foreign aid programs. To date, P.L. 480 has provided about 375 million metric tons of food aid valued at over \$50 billion. U.S. food aid has saved the lives of millions of people.

U.S. agricultural commodity programs are a powerful instrument for promoting peace, and U.S. exports on a global scale. In the 1960's, P.L. 480 exports grew dramatically, representing almost 25 percent of total U.S. farm exports. Food aid increased the development of markets for U.S. agricultural products worldwide. P.L. 480 has evolved over the years to meet changing priorities and to reflect experiences in delivering humanitarian assistance. In 1990, Congress passed the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (FACTA), containing the first comprehensive reorganization of Public Law 480, emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of private voluntary organizations. In 1996, Congress further updated P.L. 480 legislation through the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR), commonly referred to as the "1996 Farm Bill". It reasserted the intent of the U.S. to use its agricultural productivity to promote the foreign policy of the U.S. by enhancing food security in the developing world.

The P.L. 480 Title II program serves U.S. foreign policy by helping to secure peace, supporting the establishment and consolidation of democracies. While expanding markets for U.S. commodities, it also fostered economic growth and promoted sustainable development. Humanitarian assistance is a key strategic goal of USAID. The provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster responds to U.S. values and ideals by protecting human health and saving lives. Aligned with U.S. national interests, food aid prevents and minimizes the human costs of conflict and natural disasters.

## **Challenges**

The current estimation is that acute hunger affects over 30 million victims of disaster annually. It is estimated that at least 200 million women and children are chronically undernourished at critical times in their lives, and 840 million are chronically under-nourished in the world. While no region is immune to hunger and food insecurity, some are more prone than others to be food insecure. The two regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are of particular concern, since food production is not expected to keep pace with population growth. Thirty-five percent of the African population and 18 percent of the East and South Asian populations presently are hungry or chronically undernourished.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, 26 of 36 countries are projected to be in need of food aid even under favorable financial conditions in 2005. East Africa, with 36 percent of the population, has the largest chronic food aid needs. The countries in South and East Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and South China) contain half of the world's population, and the number of people

considered food-insecure in the region is estimated at 252 million.

Over the past two decades, global food needs have increased steadily. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that total food requirements to maintain consumption and to meet emergency needs, about 15 million tons in 1996, will increase to 27 million tons by 2005. During 1997, emergencies continued to place a strain on already-diminished global food aid resources. Despite lower global food aid resource availability, USDA estimated that emergency food aid needs will increase from the current 4.8 million metric tons to between 5.7 and 6.2 million metric tons by the year 2005 (USDA/ERS, 1995). While representing only approximately 10 percent of total food aid in the 1970's, emergency food aid now approximates 35 percent of total food aid. Title II emergency assistance in FY 1997 (\$404 million) was almost half the total Title II budget.

While food needs have increased steadily, global food assistance fell to an all-time low of 6.7 million metric tons of cereals for relief and development activities in 1996-97, from 15 million metric tons in 1992-93. As part of overall reductions in U.S. foreign assistance, the appropriation for U.S. food aid has been substantially cut, with reductions in Title I and Title III and the elimination of the Section 416 resources. Title II of P.L. 480, however, has been maintained at close to previous levels. (*1997 U.S. International Food Assistance Report, January 1998*)

### ***Complex Emergencies***

The World Food Summit (Rome, November 1996) noted the increasing number of civil conflicts and the need to “meet transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development and a capacity to satisfy future needs.” Although complex emergencies can only be resolved by political solution to the root causes of crises, humanitarian assistance is necessary in the interim to save lives and reduce human suffering.

Complex emergencies often last for years, during which large numbers of people flee their homes, either as international refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). These emergencies are characterized by disruption of traditional food supply networks, fragile or failing economic, political and social institutions, and environmental degradation.

From 1989 to 1994, the number of complex emergencies soared from 17 percent to 41 percent of all emergencies worldwide. A response which in the early 1980's cost \$300 million (in current dollars) had ballooned, by 1993, into a \$3.2 billion claim on global bilateral aid budgets. In 1994, an estimated 35 million “at risk” people consumed 4.5 million metric tons of emergency food aid. In 1995, there were 50 serious armed conflicts raging, contributing to the generation of 20 million refugees and an additional 20-25 million displaced persons. (*1997 U.S. International Food Assistance Report, January 1998*)

In 1997, new crises developed in Albania, the Central African Republic, the Congo and Indonesia, while prolonged crises continued in Afghanistan, Angola, the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), North Korea, the African Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda), Iraq, Liberia, Russian Federation (Chechnya), Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan. These emergencies resulted in the displacement and disruption of livelihoods of millions of people, and increased the demand for food assistance.

During FY 1997, SO1, through its implementing partners delivered massive emergency food aid programs in Bosnia, Rwanda and Southern Sudan. The largest, and newest food aid emergency has been in North Korea, involving food for over 20 million people. This event was attributable to a combination of natural disasters and poor government policies. Other countries requiring food assistance were Sudan (4.4 million affected) and Afghanistan (3.5 million affected). Populations on the brink of starvation in Liberia and Sierra Leone received the critical food aid they needed to become more self-reliant. In addition, food aid enabled the newly emerging democracies such as Bulgaria to weather the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a democratic, market oriented economy. In Albania, emergency Title II food aid provided through WFP reached 625,000 destitute people with no alternative means of survival and offered support at a time when coping mechanisms had been destroyed.

### *Natural Disasters*

Although the majority of emergencies addressed by SO1 were complex emergencies, the significance of natural disasters cannot be underestimated. Twenty-four percent of SO1's programs addressed natural disasters, responding to requests for emergency food aid in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and North Korea. These emergencies were caused by drought, typhoons or cyclones, or a combination of these, as in the case of North Korea. Since March 1997, SO1 has been carefully monitoring the El Niño phenomenon, and has rapidly deployed assistance where needed (Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Indonesia). The last major El Niño occurred in 1982/83, and was estimated to have caused more than \$13 billion in damage worldwide. The current phenomenon is predicted to be of an intensity surpassing those of 1982/83 and 1991/92. It has already caused significant damage on all the continents.

In East Africa, torrential rains preceded by a major drought, have had a disastrous impact on a rural population which was already fragile. The worst flooding in more than three decades is affecting parts of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan. Worst hit was Somalia, where more than 2,000 people died within a period of two months. In Somalia and Kenya, thousands of people lost their homes and irrigated crops, and large numbers of livestock drowned. Roads and bridges have been washed away, making it extremely difficult for humanitarian assistance to reach people trapped in their flooded villages. The floods have put an additional strain on an already weak food security situation with thousands of newly displaced persons.

In Asia, current drought situations in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Malaysia can also be traced to El Niño. In Bangladesh, floods caused by heavy rains in the south eastern parts of the country left over 100,000 people homeless, and damaged crops and property. It is estimated that up to two-thirds of China has been affected by prolonged dry spells and six million hectares of crops were damaged. In Central America and the Caribbean, drought has damaged crops in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, and ruined food crops and disrupted the planting cycles in Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti. Finally, El Niño-related problems have continued into FY 1998 and are not likely to diminish until mid to late FY 1999. For example, the current drought in Indonesia is reported to be the worst in 50 years.

El Niño has increased the number of food-insecure people throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America. The full effects of the El Niño phenomenon remain to be seen. (*FAO, WFP reports, 1997, 1998*)

### **Meeting the Demand for Emergency Food Assistance**

The United States has been the world's largest humanitarian food aid donor since the inception of the Food for Peace program. Currently, the United States provides more than half of all the humanitarian food aid in the world. The European Union is the second largest donor, followed by Canada, Japan, Australia, Germany and The Netherlands. U.S. donations reached a maximum of about 8.4 million tons in 1993. However, due to major reductions in Title I and Title III programs and the elimination of USDA's Section 416, U.S. donations have fallen precipitously to just over 3 million tons.

### ***Staff and Financial Constraints***

The World Food Summit (November 1996) noted that long-term political commitment and leadership will be essential to reach and sustain food security, and that food aid will continue to play a critical role in emergencies, safety nets and other direct feeding programs. The U.S. reaffirmed its commitment and involvement to improve its food aid programs in terms of responding to emergencies and helping food insecure populations reach the point where they can feed themselves.

There is a single, significant constraint to keeping this U.S. commitment. This is the ***critical shortage*** of human and financial resources to deliver U.S. Title II emergency food aid. The straight-lined Title II budget and staff levels, declining Agency operating expense funds, and an increasing workload due to the labor-intensive nature of complex emergencies present a major challenge. Monitoring and accountability are impaired because of adverse operating environments in insecure regions where emergency programs are undertaken, and USAID's own working environment with \$404 million (FY 1997) of U.S. emergency food aid managed by a total of six country backstop officers (CBOs). Although programs continue to increase



in number and complexity, the staffing and operating expense levels have remained stagnant; and repeated requests for increased staffing have been denied.

The effects of this constraint are becoming increasingly apparent in vulnerabilities faced by USAID in implementing partner complaints and IG audits and investigations. For example, a recent report assessing USAID Washington and field collaboration in the use of central resources (*John M. Miller, in collaboration with the USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Transitions Team, February 1998*) was critical of FFP's response to food aid requests, noting inordinate delays in the process. These delays are due to the heavy workload of six CBOs managing 45 programs in 28 countries, including Protracted Relief Operations. (The expanded SO1 team totals 14 persons including the aforementioned CBOs, management and support staff.) The majority or 76 percent of all programs in FY 1997 dealt with complex emergencies that require considerable coordination among donors and other international agencies. In addition, "some missions lack qualified FFP officers and/or senior managers who fully understand food aid. As a result, food aid is too often not fully integrated into mission strategies or given an adequate priority for time and attention." (*J. Miller, February 1998*).

Due to the continued lack of staff and field mission support for emergency programs, and the sheer volume and intensity of U.S. emergency food aid, the SO1 team has to realistically adjust its responsiveness to food aid requests. SO1 can no longer guarantee that U.S. emergency food aid will always be deployed on a timely basis to meet the critical needs of victims of crisis and disaster; or that it will be deployed in the most effective way or in a coordinated manner with donors and USAID Missions. This will most likely increase USAID's vulnerability to criticisms from implementing partners, donors, international agencies, and Congress. This problem must be addressed as a high priority within the Agency.

## PART II: PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

### Background

The SO1 team (hereafter referred to as "SO1") is committed to strengthening its performance in managing emergency food aid to demonstrate results. Last year, SO1 developed its strategic plan for fiscal years 1997 - 2001 in which it articulated its **Strategic Objective #1** (SO1) for emergencies as “**Critical food needs of targeted groups met**”. This objective is consistent with BHR's Strategic Objective 1, “Critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations met”, and also with the Agency's Strategic Goal, “Lives saved, suffering reduced and development potential reinforced.”

SO1's performance is measured by the: (a) percentage of targeted populations reached by food aid and (b) change or maintenance in nutritional status of beneficiaries (measured by percentage of programs reporting change/maintenance of nutritional status of beneficiaries). The Intermediate Results (IR's) outlined to fulfill the strategic objective are: (a) improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable; (b) food aid delivered to target groups on schedule; (c) improved planning to transition relief activities to development; and, (d) strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs.

The strategic plan and performance indicators were developed in fiscal year 1996 in consultation with implementing partners through a series of meetings and dialogue over several months. It was recognized that measuring performance is complex because of the varied and sudden nature of emergencies, the difficulties in collecting data in dangerous and politically sensitive environments, and the short duration of programs. Therefore, the approach is to lay the groundwork and incrementally refine performance indicators and monitoring systems as experience is gained.

### Field Testing and Reporting Issues

FFP/ER, in cooperation with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), conducted a series of performance measurement workshops with implementing partners. These were held in the U.S., Angola and Kenya. The workshops brought together PVO, WFP, European Union and USAID mission staff to explore ways to improve results reporting. One workshop (Kenya for Southern Sudan programs) clearly revealed that PVOs were collecting a considerable amount of data, and more than required to report on SO1 performance indicators. PVOs believed they could meet reporting requirements if these were communicated clearly. However, participants voiced the concern, shared by SO1, that qualitative results may not be captured in performance reporting.

The workshops provided a better understanding of USAID's performance measurement efforts

and highlighted several other issues. One was the need to develop common definitions and terms used in humanitarian assistance within USAID and among PVOs, WFP, and other international agencies and donors. The discussion on “what happens to *people* in emergencies” led to the identification of interventions and appropriate indicators from the pre-crisis stage to community rehabilitation. Recognizing the need for better coordination, a Humanitarian Assistance Working Group was formed. This included representation of relevant offices concerned with humanitarian assistance: FFP, OFDA, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the Department of State, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination/Center for Development, Information and Evaluation (PPC/CDIE), Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Program, Planning and Evaluation (BHR/PPE), and PVO groups, Food Aid Management (FAM) and InterAction. The Working Group finalized a list of definitions and is currently developing a menu of sector-specific humanitarian assistance performance indicators.

### **Accomplishments and Anticipated Results**

Last year, the SO1 team established a preliminary baseline for its results framework. Fiscal year 1996 performance was assessed through a review of program documents available at FFP, and corroborated by FFP/ER country backstop officers. SO1 indicated that fiscal year 1997 data would be used to validate the preliminary baseline. It also indicated that yearly performance targets may have to be revised on the basis of the revised baseline data. Accordingly, this year, revised targets are presented in performance tables that follow in this section.

SO1 is linking its targets and results to resources. If additional resources are not provided, it is not possible to improve or maintain performance in the two results that are driven by availability of resources. IR2 are indicators internal to SO1's management of emergency food aid and are responsive to available human resources. The result obtained for “percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages” was 33 percent in FY 1997 compared to 30 percent in FY 1996, that is, performance has deteriorated. The planned target of 30 percent for FY 1997 was not met. This is indicative of the internal working constraints.

The result obtained for “percent of programs reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt” indicates a 37 percent achievement. The planned target of 15 percent was exceeded. However, this target was set based on the initial baseline of only 8 percent of all managed programs. This baseline may not be reliable as the tracking system was not fully operational in fiscal year 1996.

In good faith, SO1 explored alternative solutions to improve performance in these areas. SO1 adjusted internal processes to speed review and approval of grant proposals and developed new innovative approaches to meet urgent commodity needs. However, in spite of all these efforts, it is clear that the critical constraint - too many programs and too few people - caused by lack of resources must be addressed to effectively improve performance. Remedial

action in strengthening resources is critical if results are to improve.

Results reflective of program performance by partners (all other indicators) are generally very strong. Except for one result (where definition and analysis were modified), performance exceeded planned targets (see Annex 2 for summary of fiscal years 1996 and 1997). Targets outlined last year are being maintained for results that demonstrated strong performances and exceeded expectations. Adjustments will be made only if additional resources are provided because SO1 believes that the time and effort it invested in collecting data from implementing partners for this R4 process contributed to the strong performance. The involvement of implementing partners resulted in increased availability of both quantitative and qualitative data, and the specificity of responses to each performance indicator. This can only be maintained with additional resources.

For evaluating fiscal year 1997 performance, SO1 utilized last year's reporting questionnaire which was refined to achieve specificity of responses. It also accommodated for the provision of qualitative information and context for each question. The questionnaire was completed based on available information at FFP (similar to last year) and then sent to each implementing partner for verification. This was further corroborated by FFP/ER officers. In some cases, follow-up discussions with implementing partners took place to further clarify responses and verify data. SO1 received 100 percent return on questionnaires from its PVO partners who implemented 21 of the 35 core emergency programs.

The rest of the programs were largely implemented by WFP who were contacted later in the process. There was excellent collaboration with WFP/Rome and its field offices who returned 10 of the 13 questionnaires sent for verification. In addition, reports provided by WFP have generally provided excellent information on joint activities. Reporting issues with WFP, particularly on the Protracted Relief Operations will be followed up by SO1 later this year if resources are available.

In reviewing the performance of emergency programs, it is important that interpretation of quantitative data must be accompanied by "contextual" understanding, as progress and "success" is relative to continuous changing situations. Emergency programs are dealing with a reality that does not stay still. This is well-illustrated in one case study presented in the section dealing with SO1, Indicator 1 result where reaching 8 percent of targeted groups was considered successful, compared to an earlier 79 percent result because of the changed circumstances.

During FY 1997, SO1 and its implementing partners made significant progress in testing new operational and program approaches. Some of the achievements, and lessons learned, are not always quantified, and thus may not be reflected in performance tables. A selection of case studies are provided to illustrate *how* and to what extent achievements are being made. All these achievements are more significant given the challenges of providing food under emergency situations. These field experiences may help provide a clearer comprehension of the complexities in delivering emergency food aid, and, hopefully, appreciation of

accomplishments by SO1 and its implementing partners.

It is hoped that the good will and dedicated commitment demonstrated by SO1 in striving towards management-for-results will be recognized. The following results and success stories are illustrative of the hard work and great effort that have been invested to demonstrate USAID's achievements in the humanitarian assistance area. This level of effort cannot be maintained without the required staff resources. *This will be a great loss to USAID's performance reporting on its humanitarian assistance programs and to the overall achievement of this strategic goal.*

Performance tables detailing each performance indicator and case studies are outlined as follow in Tables 1 - 10:

**TABLE 1: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1, INDICATOR 1**

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 1: <b>Percent of targeted population reached by food aid</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of targeted populations. In future, percent of targeted populations by (a) gender and (b) age	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets *
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, transfer authorizations (TA). Verified by questionnaire/survey	1996	(baseline year)	67%	
	1997	67%	<b>74.4%</b>	74.4%
Indicator Definition: “Targeted population” as defined at program start	1998	70%		70%
	1999	75%		75%
*With the same level of resources, and continued or increased number and complexity of programs, food aid will continue to reach targeted populations at approximately the original planned level. However, it will not be possible for Food for Peace to guarantee the <u>timeliness</u> of food aid. The initial targets are being maintained.	2000	80%		80%
	2001	85%		85%

*Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met: Percent of Targeted Population Reached by Food Aid*

In fiscal year 1997, SO1 reached an estimated total of **11.5 million** beneficiaries through emergency food aid. This represents **74.4** percent of the population targeted by its implementing partners, WFP, U.S. PVOs, and one government (Ethiopia).

[In addition to the 11.5 million beneficiaries reached through emergency programs, an estimated 4,676,140 beneficiaries were supported through WFP's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs), implemented in Africa (7 countries) and in Asia (3 countries). PROs are not reflected in the 35 programs assessed for fiscal year performance because of lack of staff resources needed to proactively backstop the PROs. If resources are provided per this R4 request, SO1 will be able to invest the time and staff required to coordinate with WFP reporting on PRO activities.]

A total of 35 programs were implemented in 24 countries (note: Rwanda Regional program comprises 6 countries) with the majority of programs undertaken in Africa (75%), then

Europe (17%) and Asia (8%).

**Implementing Partners of Emergency Food Aid Programs:**

**A. U.S. PVOs**

*Adventist Development & Relief Agency Development (ADRA)*

*American Red Cross (ARC)*

*Amigos Internacionales*

*Catholic Relief Services (CRS)*

*Cooperative for Assistance & Relief Everywhere (CARE)*

*International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC)*

*Mercy Corps International*

*Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)*

*Save the Children Federation (SCF)*

*The Doulos Community*

*World Vision Relief & Development (WVRD)*

**B. The World Food Program (WFP)**

**C. Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Commission (DPPC),  
Ethiopia**

Twenty-six programs (76%) addressed complex emergencies while the remainder responded to natural disasters (24%).

Program duration ranged from one to fifteen months. Most were twelve-month activities, followed by programs lasting six months, then three months, followed by programs lasting nine and four months (see Annex 5).

The types of activities undertaken by programs were, in order of frequency, targeted food distribution (undertaken by 77% of programs), followed by

supplementary feeding (by 40% of programs), therapeutic feeding and food-for-work (by 37% of programs), followed by general free food distribution (by 34% of programs), and food-for-agriculture (17% of programs). Other activities such as cash-for-work, monetization, monitoring, rehabilitation activities were undertaken by 14 percent of programs.

SO1 made progress in collecting information on the profile of beneficiaries most frequently included in emergency food aid programs. The majority of the core emergency programs included IDPs as their main beneficiaries among the disaster groups of IDPs, refugees, and resettled/returnees. Most programs targeted food insecure groups such as victims of natural disasters (drought, typhoon, cyclone) and complex emergencies.

The collection of data on targeted groups reached with food aid is not an easy task in emergency situations. The delivery of food aid to targeted groups is largely dependant on security situations and access to intended beneficiaries. The continuous shifts in vulnerable groups and changing situations requires continuous monitoring and recalibration of affected and targeted number of beneficiaries versus those actually receiving food aid. The assumption is made that there is accuracy in the number of beneficiaries being targeted, in order to accurately determine performance.

In the review of program reports and documents, there are instances where there may have been over-estimation of beneficiaries, which reflects negatively on actual numbers reached with food aid. There are also instances where reaching even a small portion of targeted groups should be considered successful given the context of the situation. Qualitative information then becomes essential to fully comprehend the complexities and challenges of emergency food aid programming, and to fully appreciate the “story” behind performance

numbers. The rating of performance in terms of whether targets were met in delivering humanitarian assistance should be done with considerable reflection and full comprehension of each individual situation. Success is relative, and only fully measured by beneficiaries themselves. What follows are some of the more noteworthy case studies and experiences.

*Sierra Leone* provides a good example of the continuous challenges faced by SO1 and its implementing partners. Democratic elections in March 1996 led to a marked decrease in insecurity. However, the situation changed abruptly with the military take-over of the government, and insecurity led to disruptions of humanitarian relief by June 1997, with a blocking of additional food inputs after the coup (through February 1998). As of June 1997, there were approximately two million people affected by the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, some of whom still remained inaccessible or only periodically accessible to humanitarian aid. (*Third Report on the World Nutrition Situation, December 1997*)

In this context, SO1's food distributions in Sierra Leone were radically reduced, with the majority of commodities diverted to nearby countries. Most of the stock that remained in the country (which were not looted), were distributed to intended beneficiaries. Despite the coup, CARE provided food aid to approximately 16,000 IDP farming families, ensuring that families are not obliged to eat their rice seed so that they have the ability to raise a good harvest. This addressed an immediate need, and helped to re-establish agricultural productivity, and hence their household livelihood potential. CARE reported reaching 65,000 beneficiaries of their estimated intended beneficiaries of 200,000.

Another implementing partner, CRS reached 231,000 or 79 percent of their targeted 292,000 beneficiaries in the third quarter of 1997 primarily due to sufficient in-country food stocks. However, it reached only 8 percent of targeted beneficiaries in the fourth quarter of 1997 when these stocks were depleted and cross-border operations remained blocked for political reasons. Notwithstanding the insecurity problems, CRS successfully resettled 184,000 IDPs and implemented a strategy to encourage investment in the communities and to discourage any premature migration to urban centers (*CARE/CRS Sierra Leone*).

Food has shown exceptional importance in attracting the resettlement of people detached from their social and economic settings by years of war. In collaboration with *Africare* and other agencies, *WVRD* designed agricultural programs to encourage IDPs to return. It was only when general camp feeding was discontinued in favor of resettlement rations, requiring these rations to follow IDPs to their communities, that the IDPs returned in masses to their villages. This response underscores the fact that security and other recovery inputs by themselves are not enough when resettling people. Food is crucial. (*WVRD annual report, March 1998*)

The U.S. is the second largest humanitarian aid donor to *Bulgaria*, providing nearly \$11 million. As a result of the immediate and significant humanitarian support provided by donors, "a severe humanitarian crisis was averted in Bulgaria" (comment by European Union representative, the U.S. Ambassador and USAID Mission). Although the overall situation for vulnerable groups has improved since a year ago, the situation is still grim.



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*“All beneficiaries expressed their deep appreciation to the American people for the gift of food during a time of great need, and asked that this message be shared with others.”*

*USAID monitoring report, Bulgaria, January 1998*

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Bulgarian families employed an impressive range of coping skills ranging from consolidation of households, foregoing heat in winter, and developing home gardens in backyards and rooftops. A recent UNDP-funded survey indicated that up to 8 percent of Bulgaria's GNP now comes from home gardens. A recent

USAID monitoring visit noted that U.S. aid was making a visible difference in people's lives, with many unemployed persons commenting that picking up the “American bread” provided by CRS each day was a high point in their otherwise bleak day.

**TABLE 2: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1, INDICATOR 2**

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 2: <b>Change (maintenance) in nutritional status of target groups</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs.	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports (rapid assessments, secondary data), proposals, TAs. Performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	37%	
	1997	37%	<b>62%</b>	62%
Indicator Definition: Percent of programs reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status of target groups.	1998	50%		50%
	1999	55%		55%
Comments: This is measured as percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status. Where appropriate and feasible, programs will collect information on the percentage of target groups, by gender and sex, with improved or maintained nutritional status using anthropometric measures (a nutrition template has been provided). Collaboration with other groups to access nutrition information (and/or secondary data) is encouraged.	2000	60%		60%
	2001	65 %		65%

*Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met: Change in Nutritional Status of Target Groups*

The SO1 team made a bold step to include nutritional status as its impact indicator. The operating assumption is that food aid is to be complemented with non-food resources, especially water, sanitation and basic health services, for nutritional status to be improved or maintained. SO1 indicated that this information will be provided based on feasibility of data collection and urged its implementing partners to try to provide this information, either from primary or secondary data sources, such as from UNICEF, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other NGOs who undertake nutrition surveys on a regular basis.

As part of the efforts to improve reporting, SO1 developed a nutrition template to guide implementing partners on the level and type of information being requested. Based on feedback from PVOs, and with considerable input from the United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination, Subcommittee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN), the template has undergone a final revision and will be part of the reporting guideline. Data will be shared and coordinated with the ACC/SCN which compiles information on nutritional status of refugees and displaced populations primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa. Information is currently

shared by United Nations members and implementing partners of SOI such as WFP and UNHCR, as well as from UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank who address emergencies. Efforts are underway to coordinate more closely with ACC/SCN and U.S. PVOs involved in P.L. 480 Title II food aid have been requested to send nutrition information to this coordinating body.

SOI's approach in reporting on the nutrition indicator is based on practical considerations of emergency programs, which vary in duration and in the types of activities undertaken. Reporting on this indicator is necessarily incremental, and in this initial phase, it is based on reports from implementing partners, who indicate whether or not they have supporting data for their response. In the next phase, supporting data will be reviewed and compiled to improve SOI's reporting on this indicator. Reporting on nutritional status for the R4 will be determined by how and what data is collected, for example, population-based surveys versus clinic-based information, and what measures are being used. As a minimum, PVOs have indicated that information on edema is being collected. Some implementing partners and collaborating groups collect weight-for-height data.

Weight-for-height reflects acute malnutrition (wasting) in children under five years of age and is closely associated with risk of death. The recent ACC/SCN analysis bears out what was shown in the *Update on the Nutrition Situation, 1994* (ACC/SCN 1994). That is, high levels of wasting are a good predictor of elevated mortality (i.e., above 1/10,000 day). Based on more recent data and trends from 1994 to 1997, levels of wasting above 10% indicate elevated mortality. (Third Report on the World Nutrition Situation, December 1997)

During fiscal year 1997, **62 percent** of programs reported to have changed and/or maintained nutritional status of beneficiaries. Of this group, **71 percent** of programs indicated that they are able to provide supporting reports or data. Two programs indicated that this report was based on anecdotal information or observations, and one program based its response purely on assumptions made (see Annex 4).

In *Kenya*, WFP is providing food to drought-affected groups, including to 452,016 school children and to 443,702 food insecure families. The provision of food to school children helped to maintain attendance of children at the pre-primary and primary school level in the drought-affected areas. One of the program's objectives is to restore and maintain the nutritional well-being of affected populations. After five months, the nutritional status of beneficiaries generally improved, although full recovery is expected to take longer (WFP/Kenya).

In *Sudan*, ADRA addresses malnutrition of children under five in four displaced camps. Based on the last two surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996, the malnutrition rates in the camps ranged from 13 - 29 percent. These rates have yet to stabilize at normal levels, and ADRA's targeted malnutrition rate of 15 percent has yet to be reached. [Note: 15 percent malnutrition rate is still too high; above 10 percent is associated with increased mortality.] This is largely because malnutrition is caused by many factors other than access to food. The

lack of medical facilities, essential drugs and proper health education have been a persistent problem negating overall program gains. ADRA is strengthening links with other organizations involved in water, health and sanitation projects. Concentrated therapeutic feeding and wet feeding of malnourished children in feeding centers have been successful. ADRA noted individual cases of malnourished children becoming well-nourished with weight gain within three months of the program (ADRA/Sudan). CRS' surveys (weight-for-height) conducted in four camps in 1996 and

*See full story in Annex 6*

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*A young boy is severely malnourished. His mother brings him to the wet feeding center of Anna Sudan, a local NGO partner in El Salaam Camp, Sudan. Within 3 months the boy is well enough to go home. The mother, in gratitude, changes the boy's name to "ADRA". ADRA, Sudan*

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1997 show mixed results: improvement in two camps but significant deterioration in the other camps. The program reported that nutritional status has deteriorated because of drought, insecurity and poor health and sanitation conditions (CRS/Sudan).

The recent report of ACC/SCN indicated that although the total number of refugees and displaced people in Sub-Saharan Africa is decreasing (UNHCR 1996), the number estimated to be at heightened nutritional risk, defined as high levels of wasting and/or mortality due often to factors like inaccessibility, has remained roughly constant. Furthermore, the socio-political situation in many countries in mid-1997, notably the Great Lakes region and Somalia, are very tense and could easily deteriorate leading to population displacement, some for the second or third time. El Nino has had an impact on the further displacement of refugees and populations already vulnerable to food insecurity. The ACC/SCN report noted the gradual improvement of access to populations in need in *Angola* which led to a dramatic improvement in nutritional status. The regular provision of emergency food aid and essential medical care almost always brought the situation rapidly under control. In many areas, a continued lack of basic health services were identified as a major factor contributing to persistently high levels of wasting. Another example is the situation in the Great Lakes region where humanitarian aid was delivered to over 2 million refugees and IDPs. Elevated levels of wasting and high crude mortality rates in the Goma camps were rapidly brought under control and remained below rates seen in the local population throughout 1996.

In *Liberia*, almost 2 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance throughout 1995 and 1996. The number of people requiring aid began to decrease in 1997 as the disarmament process took hold and a new president was elected. As villages became accessible to humanitarian assistance, extremely high levels of wasting were often seen. For example, in Lower Bong and Upper Margibi, wasting was almost 20 percent and edema was measured at 37 percent. A follow-up survey was undertaken after the implementation of general ration and selective feeding programs. Wasting and/or edema had decreased to 6.4 percent.

A similar situation prevailed in Tubmanburg, which was inaccessible to humanitarian aid for almost eight months. Wasting levels of almost 40 percent were measured, with 32 percent

severe wasting. Mortality rates were 40 times normal and under-five mortality rates were 50 times normal. After one month of emergency aid delivered, the crude mortality rate had decreased to 5.4/10,000/day. Although this marked an extreme improvement, mortality rates were still ten times the normal rate in mid-October 1996. (*Third Report on the World Nutrition Situation, December 1997; Chapter 3: The Nutrition of Refugees and Displaced Populations*)

**TABLE 3: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1, INDICATOR 1**

Intermediate Result 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 1: <b>Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets
Data Source: Needs assessment reports, cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, TAs. Performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	53%	
	1997	55 %	<b>85%</b>	85%
Indicator Definition: Needs assessment guidelines to be established - to include assessment of vulnerabilities (including gender & ethnic issues), local capacities, nutritional status. "Vulnerable populations": groups that (a) will experience acute decline in food access, and are unable to sufficiently meet their basic food needs (b) are susceptible to natural or man-made disasters	1998	55 %		55%
	1999	60%		60%
Comments: Initial needs assessment for proposal, recalibration at program start, then semi-annually, except for programs less than 6 months (only initial assessment)	2000	65%		65%
	2001	65%		65%

*Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations: Percent of Programs that have Instituted a Continuous Process of Needs Assessment and Recalibration of Targeting*

Since the development of its results framework and this performance indicator, SO1 sought to ensure that food aid is effectively used to target the most vulnerable groups. This is not always easy as there are continuous shifts in vulnerable populations. In addition, food security situations may deteriorate or improve more rapidly than expected. Implementing partners are seeking to institute a periodic process of needs assessment and recalibrate targeting of beneficiaries based on this monitoring process. A major constraint is the security

risk to implementing partners when there may be local vested interest in maintaining elevated numbers.

In FY 1997, **85 percent** of programs reported to have instituted periodic needs assessments (or used secondary information from other agencies). Progress still needs to be made to understand how the various methodologies in needs assessment might be employed or modified to obtain crucial information such as the identification of the most vulnerable groups, a clearer understanding of coping mechanisms, and how this might affect the level and type of food commodities being delivered. Although the continuous assessment and monitoring of food aid is difficult under challenging conditions, implementing partners continue to address this issue.

For example, *WFP in Angola* undertakes needs assessments at least twice a month and consequently has established a supplementary feeding program to address the needs of the malnourished (*WFP/Angola*). On the other hand, in the *Kenya* program, rations were reduced in areas no longer requiring full ration. *WFP*, in consultation with NGOs, affected a gradual and steady reduction in the ration scale/beneficiary coverage. Factors considered were the timing of the harvest, and the availability of other coping mechanisms. The rations were reduced from 80 percent of a full ration in August 1997 to 40 percent in January 1998 (*WFP/Kenya*).

In *Tajikistan*, actions were taken to refine the beneficiary lists based on needs assessments undertaken semi-annually. Analysis included coping strategies, markets, nutritional and health status, and poverty level, which was the main selection criteria. *WFP* undertook an innovative food-for-work project in which the beneficiaries started growing their own food. More than 2,000 beneficiaries shifted from relief food distribution to self-help food-for-work activities (*WFP/Tajikistan*).

Heightened insecurity causes an increase in number of persons displaced. Programs have to adjust the level of ration and/or the type of program activities in order to maintain a delicate equilibrium. What is successful or not is relative to prevailing situations which change continuously. In *Uganda*, insecurity increased the number of persons displaced by rebel activities in the northern part of the country. Depending on the severity of the camp situation, *WFP* accommodated the increase in caseload by scaling back rations; food-for-work and targeted feeding were initiated. A general food distribution would have created an increased influx of IDPs which would have strained existing facilities, such as water and sanitation. The food-for-work projects acted as a self-targeting mechanism with only those in genuine need participating regularly. A total of 59,000 beneficiaries received family rations during the six months of the project. Of the beneficiaries, 64 percent were females and 36 percent were males. Although El Nino affected the harvest with only 25 percent of expected yields realized, the beneficiaries viewed the project as a “success”. (*WFP Uganda*).

In *North Korea*, five PVOs formed a consortium to monitor 55,000 metric tons of the total U.S. Government contribution of 177,000 metric tons through *WFP*. This was distributed to

3.7 million beneficiaries throughout the country within three months (August - November 1997). Over 100 counties received food aid and disbursed it through 10 to 20 distribution centers per county. The monitoring team sought to ensure that U.S. food aid reached vulnerable groups such as children between six and twelve, the elderly, and food-for-work beneficiaries. Working closely with WFP, the team traveled to ten provinces. They visited ports, warehouses, distribution centers, schools, hospitals and food-for-work sites; and consulted local government officials and beneficiaries. Although there were difficulties, including lack of access to areas closed to outsiders, and the inability to fully verify whether the assistance reached the entire targeted group, this was a huge and impressive undertaking. It set a precedent for establishing an on-the-ground presence of U.S. citizens to monitor U.S. food aid in North Korea (*PVO Consortium in Pyongyang, final report, January 1998*).

Natural disasters are quick onset emergencies, and are generally short-term in nature, ranging from two to six months. In these situations, needs assessment are undertaken only in the beginning and intervention is generally limited in scale. Food aid dependency is generally avoided, and as in the *CRS* program in *Madagascar*, beneficiaries themselves withdrew from the program when the new harvest arrived (*CRS/Madagascar*).

**TABLE 4: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1, INDICATOR 2**

Intermediate Result 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 2: <b>Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets *
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, TAs.. Performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	90%	
	1997	90%	<b>67.5%</b>	67.5%
Indicator Definition: “Targeted population”: those selected at program start by cooperating sponsor. Food ration level to be defined and agreed to at program start should take into consideration special nutritional needs of different groups (e.g., pregnant & lactating women, children, malnourished)	1998	92%		65%
	1999	94%		65%
Comments: This year, this was reviewed to focus on special <u>nutritional</u> needs, such as the malnourished, rather than on general need for food. *The targets are revised based on the new baseline.	2000	96%		68%
	2001	96%		70%

*Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations: Percent of Programs that have Incorporated Special Needs of Different Targeted Groups*

The majority of programs targeted general food insecure groups. Efforts were made to identify special vulnerable groups within this larger group. The groups most frequently targeted by programs, were in order: (a) malnourished, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly; (b) children under 5, malnourished children under 5; (c) children in general, the sick (in hospitals, clinics); (d) malnourished children (all ages), orphans, handicapped; (e) widows and female-headed households, preschool and school children, unaccompanied children; (f) children in prison, women in general, malnourished women (see Annex 5). This information is important for the future review of food rations and whether or not they meet the nutritional needs of the most vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating women, children under five years of age, and the malnourished.

In *Sudan*, ADRA initiated a targeted scheme for addressing and tracking the needs of malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women. Successful strategies included a targeted scheme to accept only lactating women previously registered in the pregnant feeding program and follow-up of birth weight of children whose mothers participated in the feeding program for pregnant women. ADRA also undertook a comparative study of the average stay of children in the supplementary feeding program of different feeding centers and



implemented more accurate and regular tracking of program beneficiaries (*ADRA/Sudan*). Likewise, when there was a planned food cut for the general displaced populations to coincide with the crop harvest, *CRS* ensured that rations continued to be provided to the most vulnerable groups - elderly, children, and pregnant women. Food was given to *Action Contre le Faim (ACF)* for the supplementary feeding program which addressed the nutritional needs of 1,600 malnourished children (*CRS/Sudan*). Likewise, in *Kenya*, *WFP* organized monthly coordination meetings with NGOs, government representatives, and other United Nations agencies. At these meetings, field reports of areas and groups requiring special needs were reported; NGOs provided therapeutic feeding to the malnourished (*WFP/Kenya*).

The U.S. was the largest food aid donor to *Rwanda* in 1997, providing 49 percent of all food commodities (125,000 metric tons) distributed by *WFP*. The program targeted refugees and survivors of the 1993-94 genocide, particularly widows, orphans, and returnees from former *Zaire* and *Tanzania*. The program addressed the nutritional needs of pregnant women and children, considered the most vulnerable in *Rwandan* society. They were reached through wet feeding programs in nutrition centers. In 1997, *WFP* provided 10,500 metric tons to 280 nutrition centers benefiting 60,600 people every month. *WFP* also assisted unaccompanied children's centers, orphanages, and inpatient feeding in hospitals (*WFP Rwanda Country Office Report, 1997*).

In *Uganda*, supplementary feeding was provided to moderately malnourished children under five years of age and their mothers. Supplementary feeding centers were set up in existing health units close to the displaced camps. Through the screening process, a total of 5,000 severe cases were referred to the therapeutic feeding centers. Corn-soy-blend (CSB) was added to the general ration for supplementary feeding (*WFP/Uganda*). Similarly, *CRS'* institutional feeding program in *Rwanda* targeted 4,000 beneficiaries. Most of the beneficiaries were children under the age of 15, many unaccompanied and/or orphans (*CRS/Rwanda*).

Programs implemented by *ADRA*, *ARC*, *CRS*, *IOCC*, and *WFP*, in *Bosnia* and *Bulgaria* targeted special needs of elderly pensioners and extremely vulnerable individuals. Some of these activities were implemented in the context of a recovery strategy and a broad, comprehensive approach. For example, the *CRS* program created employment through bakery projects. Besides providing bread to the most vulnerable groups, U.S. wheat grain was used to jump-start the economy and to enhance local production capacity with a cost-recovery scheme built into the program. This approach was successful, demonstrating a willingness to address the needs of the people in a manner which strengthened local capacity (*ADRA/ARC/CRS/IOCC/WFP Bosnia, Bulgaria*).

**TABLE 5: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2, INDICATOR 1**

Intermediate Result 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 1: <b>Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets *
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports, FFP MIS, performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	30%	
	1997	30%	<b>33%</b>	33%
Indicator Definition: "Pipeline shortages": food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsors and outlined in call forwards (FFP)	1998	25%		45%
	1999	20%		50%
Comments: The volume and intensity of emergencies increased dramatically during this fiscal year. The staffing and operating expenses have remained stagnant, affecting effectiveness and timeliness of programs. To improve on this performance indicator, additional resources are <u>critical</u> .  *With same level of resources, and continued or increased number and complexity of programs, targets are being revised realistically, i.e., downwards.	2000	20%		55%
	2001	15%		60%

*Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule: Percent of Programs Experiencing Title II Pipeline Shortages*

SO1 continues to struggle with increased number of emergencies with the same level of staffing and financial resources. This is reflected in the result of this performance indicator with **33 percent** of programs experiencing pipeline shortages (food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsor and outlined in SO1's call forward). If performance is to improve, additional resources are mandatory.

Most of the food aid delivery problems cited by implementing partners were due to delays in proposal review and funding approval. This resulted in the delayed shipping of commodities. In some cases, this has greatly affected the stability of the population and the resettlement of returnees and internally-displaced populations. To cope with the situation, rations are reduced for all beneficiaries and therefore are inadequate to meet critical needs. Food commodities are sometimes borrowed, but only with great difficulty (*NPA/Sudan*).

SO1 is making efforts to deal with existing constraints. It recently reengineered its way of

doing business to expedite the delivery of food aid. Seeking innovative measures to meet the challenge of timely food aid delivery within the context of an established system which normally take 120-150 days, SO1 is taking significant steps to improve program planning and approval process and food aid delivery. These steps include: (a) the development of a proposal guideline/checklist to ensure proposals include all required items (in the past, the proposal review and approval process could be held up for several weeks due to the incompleteness of proposals); (b) the new standardized grant document; (c) two-year planning for long-term or complex emergencies with funding requirements reviewed annually against needs which will enable implementing partners to better address “transition” and longer-term issues like rehabilitation; (d) consultations with WFP to improve the timely issuance of appeals/Emergency Operations (EMOPs) and the development of management mechanisms to prevent pipeline breaks.

Direct measures to meet urgent commodity needs include (a) the prepositioning of \$5 million worth of commodities at U.S. ports for immediate loading in case of a sudden-onset emergency. This has been used successfully to meet El-Nino emergency food aid needs in Sudan, Somalia and Central America; (b) the use of special USDA procurements to ensure the arrival of food grains within two months after the start of the procurement process; (c) regional monetization activities; and, (d) the consideration of contingency stocks (being pilot-tested in Sudan). (*SO1 planning document, 1997/1998, “Emergency Planning in East Africa: How FFP Can Do Business Differently.”*)

The distribution of food commodities to beneficiaries is often the most challenging aspect of program implementation. For example, in *Uganda*, the distribution of food to displaced camps was hindered by the unpredictable nature of the insecurity in the region which made forward planning difficult. Both government and military officials assisted to the extent possible to facilitate the distribution of food but were unable to meet needs at all times (*WFP/Uganda*).

Lack of adequate transport at the project level was also one of the major problems faced by *SCF* in *Angola*. In addition, the rural roads were impassable during the rainy season. Though seed distribution was a valuable complementary activity to free food distribution, the combination of the two forms of assistance put significant pressure on available local transport. Given this problem, the beneficiaries requested that priority be given to distributing seeds and tools so that they could plant in time to catch the rains (*SCF PL-480 Title II Program Report, March 1998*).

**TABLE 6: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2, INDICATOR 2**

Intermediate Result 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 2: <b>Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of proposals	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets*
Data Source: FFP/ER (Mendez England) tracking system.	1996	(baseline year)	8%	
	1997	15 %	<b>37%</b>	37%
Indicator Definition: Reviewed and acted on by FFP/ER: approval or rejection of proposal in its entirety or parts thereof	1998	50%		35%
	1999	60%		30%
Comments: Last year, this indicator was "21 calendar" days. This year, this is reviewed as "21 business" days, excluding official holidays.  *With the same level of resources, and continued or increased number and complexity of programs, targets are realistically revised downward.	2000	60%		28%
	2001	80%		25%

*Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule: Percent of Proposals Reviewed and Cooperating Sponsors Notified of Decision within 21 Business Days of Receipt*

During fiscal year 1997, **37 percent** of proposals were reviewed and cooperating sponsors were notified of FFP/ER's decision within 21 business days. Delays in this process continue to cause delays in food distribution (see IR2, Indicator 1).

This result is based on the analysis of the tracking sheet maintained by SO1 which monitors benchmark dates from the time a proposal is received through the approval of the Transfer Authorization (TA) and notification to the implementing partner. Time interval between benchmark dates identified the problem areas. Of the 18 program proposals that failed to meet the deadline, the delays were most frequently due to delay in receiving USAID field mission comments (61%), followed by delays in the clearance process (55%). (In the future, a more detailed tracking of the clearance process will enable SO1 to identify specific areas of delays.) This was followed by delays in submitting Transfer Authorizations and response to issues from implementing partners (22% respectively). Sixteen percent of the delays were due to delay in addressing issues to cooperating sponsors. The number of days taken to

review and make a final decision on a proposal ranged from 4 to 104 days (see Annex 4).

Of those proposals which required USAID mission comments and met the 21 day performance criteria, 88 percent received USAID Mission within four business days. For half of these, comments were received before the proposal reached SO1; and the clearance process moved noticeably faster.

In order to improve on this performance, it is clear that much more effort should be placed on better coordination with USAID field missions on emergency food aid. This takes time and human resources. A large part of the constraint relates to the fact that even when there is a USAID presence, missions often do not have humanitarian strategic objectives or emergency modifiers in their strategies. Financial and human resources are, therefore, not available for emergency responses. It is also clear that the internal clearance process needs to be modified as well.

Significant delays in the approval of proposals create gaps in the program's pipeline, resulting in shortages in the field (*CRS/Sudan*). Funding delays have long-term consequences. For example, in *Sierra Leone*, the delay in funding required *WVRD* to borrow food which led to several problems, including the late commencement of the resettlement ration distributions. In other countries, like Sudan, the delay in funding and the consequent delayed arrival of food aid led to instability of populations. This was resolved through loans from WFP and other partners. However, such loans are both time-consuming and expensive for implementing organizations, and for SO1.

SO1 recently developed a new and improved program planning and approval process for SO1 objectives which should help to improve performance in this area. At the same time, the issuance of the "*PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting*" will help to improve the quality of proposals submitted by implementing partners. The goal is to have proposals arrive with all required information addressed in order to reduce time for follow-up with implementing partners.

TABLE 7: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3, INDICATOR 1

Intermediate Result 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 1: <b>Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development or relief exit strategies</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, TA's. Verified by performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	63%	
	1997	63%	<b>73%</b>	73%
Indicator Definition: Programs: emergencies coming to an end, or in transition. The plans must include transition or exit strategies.	1998	63%		63%
	1999	75%		75%
Comments: Only programs that planned <u>and</u> implemented plans are included in this percentage.	2000	80%		80%
	2001	85%		85%

*Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development: Percent of Programs that have Developed Resettlement or Rehabilitation Plans to Link Relief to Development (or Relief Exit Strategies)*

The link between relief and development was initially viewed as a continuum, or linear progression, where relief operations, in response to a humanitarian crisis, would be followed by rehabilitation and then development activities. The implication of the continuum model was that one must wait for the emergency to run its course before initiating rehabilitation and reconstruction work. However, in a long-lasting complex emergency, the full scope of relief and development linkages are not necessarily sequential. And, Title II regular programs may need to be prepared to handle sudden-onset emergencies, such as those caused by the drought and El Nino in Kenya, and the typhoon in Madagascar. SO1 and its implementing partners are developing better understanding of the intricate issues surrounding the resolution of complex emergencies. A Transitional Activity Proposal Guidance is an initial effort to guide transition programs. The process is still evolving. To move this along, clearer decisions are needed within USAID and further consultations are required with implementing partners. To most NGOs wanting to transition from relief to development, funding constraints remain. In the meanwhile, some program approaches to bridge relief and development are being explored and tested under emergency funding.

For example, in *Angola*, CARE is implementing a “transitional” project designed to respond to the changing situation in Angola as the country draws away from years of war, but is still struggles with socio-economic problems and instability. The project provides critical food

needs of vulnerable groups while addressing longer term issues. The four complementary project components include the provision of targeted emergency food aid to the most vulnerable groups including displaced and resettling populations; the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure through the provision of seasonal employment opportunities (food-for-work); the revitalization of agricultural production through the rehabilitation of formerly viable farming systems; and the monitoring of food security indicators to assist in project planning and design. Success can be measured by the progressive graduation of 17,622 beneficiaries from the free food distribution program to the food-for-work component. From an estimated 68,000 persons requiring emergency food aid (October - December 1996), only 37,000 beneficiaries remain who require gratis food. During 1996 and 1997, the project assisted 56,393 resettled internally displaced people (IDPs) with families resettled and reintegrated through agriculture rehabilitation (*CARE project reports, 1996, 1997*).

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*"As far as we are concerned, immediate food aid that we received has been an incentive to settle; seeds and tools make us feel at home, and the rehabilitation of a school and a health post make us feel at home in our real home." Traditional chief (soba), SCF/Angola*

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SCF's experience in *Angola* shows that the integration of food aid with other forms of productive inputs is a very effective way of moving people along the development continuum. When linked to seeds and tools distribution package, food aid can be considered a "development input" for recently resettled IDPs. Food support should be

considered as an integral part of livelihood security assistance, providing time and opportunity for the IDPs to determine how best to survive using local resources from their environment. In other words, food gave them the capability to work on the land while the seeds and tools increased their chances of recovery from dependency to limited self-reliance. For SCF, this program was an exciting experience which clearly demonstrated in a practical way how disaster-affected and displaced people can move from an emergency situation to a stable food production level. (*SCF PL-480 Title II Program Report*).

Insecurity has been the primary constraining factor in implementing rehabilitation plans to link relief to development. For example, in *Uganda* where contingency planning for resettlement of IDPs was undertaken, it is unlikely that IDPs will return home in the near future. However, initiatives such as block farming, food-for-work in rural development schemes and the opening up of land around the camps are underway. Pilot projects met with mixed success. For example, a food-for-work seed multiplication project succeeded in providing employment to 59,000 participants over a six-month period and rehabilitated seven farm sites that had not been used in several years (*WFP/Uganda*).

With encouragement from SO1, CRS submitted a multi-year plan for their *Southern Sudan* program. This program reflects CRS' long-term plan to facilitate the resettlement of 80,000 IDPs to their original areas. It also included the gradual repatriation of 90,000 Sudanese refugees in Northern Uganda. Another implementing partner, the *Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)* provided food and agricultural assistance to 25,000 former IDPs and refugees. Both

programs instituted activities in concert with the U.S. *Integrated Strategic Plan* for Sudan, specifically, objectives aimed at increasing local capacities for food self-reliance and facilitating viable resettlement options. An approach which adjusts ration sizes in conjunction with seeds and tools distributions has been successful in encouraging local production, even among IDP populations experiencing insecurity and uncertainty as to future resettlement prospects. Resettlement activities were designed to coincide with the provision of OFDA-funded agricultural tools and seeds, and medical services. This is reflective of the integrated nature of the U.S.'s approach to relief and rehabilitation in Sudan.

In *Liberia*, the Office of Food for Peace provided over \$23 million in FY 1997 for food aid activities. It played a major role in supporting the transition from war to peace and recovery. From 1990 to 1996, CRS and WFP implemented a joint program which focused on meeting the immediate food needs of people during the civil war. During this period, the program provided emergency food aid to over one million Liberians residing either as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps in Liberia or as refugees outside the country.

After peace was finally established and elections were held in 1997, the Title II programs which supply about 85 percent of all food aid in Liberia, shifted their emphasis from emergency feeding to post-war transition activities and the rebuilding of the country. For example, at the start of 1997, 350,000 beneficiaries received emergency food aid in IDP camps. By the end of 1997, approximately 150,000 were permanently resettled in rural areas. General food distributions in IDP camps were discontinued in favor of targeted activities in rural. The post-war transition activities include rural resettlement of IDPs and refugees, agricultural recovery such as seed protection rations, rural school feeding, food-for-work for teachers and health workers, and food-for-work for rehabilitation of institutions and infrastructure.

Emergency Title II food aid, in combination with other donor activities, played a significant role in increasing crop production in 1997. 118,000 farm families received food rations as part of the seeds and tools program funded by OFDA, the European Union and FAO. Food aid encouraged agricultural production activities for recently returned IDPs and refugees by ensuring seed rice was planted and not consumed, and by increasing farmers' energy available for doing work. In addition, food aid contributed to agricultural rehabilitation through food-for-work activities. The FAO estimates that rice production, which was approximately only 30 percent of pre-war levels in 1996, increased to 60 percent of pre-war levels in 1997. Consequently, estimated food aid needs for 1998 are reduced considerably. Scarce foreign exchange is also saved through greater food production and the reduced need for commercial imports.

Title II food aid also played a major role in rehabilitating institutions that provide critical social services. This included food-for-work for the reconstruction of health care institutions and hospitals, and the feeding of health workers and patients. Food was also provided to school teachers, vocational trainers and students in schools and vocational training institutes. This enabled over 1,200 war-affected youths to receive skills training from vocational training



institutions. The emergency school feeding program implemented by WFP resulted in the re-opening of 1,250 schools by the end of 1997. The program assisted an estimated 320,000 primary school children and 20,616 school teachers throughout Liberia (*USAID/Liberia*).

**TABLE 8: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3, INDICATOR 2**

Intermediate Result 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development				
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 2: <b>Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (do no harm)</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs which meet design criteria	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, TA's. Verified by performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	60%	
	1997	65 %	<b>91%</b>	91%
Indicator Definition: Programs are designed and implemented per established criteria that include: (a) An exit strategy which supports community stabilization (b) Local capacity building, beneficiary participation (c ) Not undermining local agricultural production or local markets (d) Integration with development assistance (if available) (e) Gender and ethnic equity based on need (assumption: this is culturally acceptable and does not endanger safety) (f) Impartial and neutral distribution network	1998	70%		70%
	1999	75%		75%
	2000	80%		80%
	2001	85%		85%

*Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development: Percent of Programs that have Paid Specific Attention to Avoid the Negative Impacts of Food Aid in Program Design and Implementation (Do No Harm)*

During fiscal year 1997, **91 percent** of programs addressed this issue. The principal areas addressed by programs were, in order of frequency: local capacity building, beneficiary participation; impartial and neutral distribution network; not undermining local agricultural production or local markets; an exit strategy which supports community stabilization;

integration with development assistance; and, gender and ethnic equity based on need (see Annex 4). During this reporting period, better and more in-depth information on this indicator has been provided by implementing partners enabling SO1 to understand what specific actions and progress were made by individual programs.

For example, In *Niger*, *CRS's* program supported community stabilization by training food aid management and distribution committees, by including beneficiaries in program planning activities, and promoting an impartial and neutral distribution network. It also ensured that food aid did not undermine local agricultural production or local markets by constructing cereal banks for the storage of cereal purchased when prices were lower and sold to communities at a lower-than-market-price during periods of scarcity.

In *Angola*, *SCF's* program enabled IDPs to create a minimum food reserve in the shortest possible time. It demonstrated that IDPs are resilient and can adapt well in their local environment. At a rapid pace, the IDPs recuperated their fields and obtained local fruits, revived their local economy through the barter system, and started using the dormant marshlands to produce vegetables both for home consumption and for sale. SCF incorporated lessons learned from an earlier project undertaken in 1995 when food aid was withdrawn too prematurely resulting in the consumption of “green maize” and which defeated the purpose of helping people to make a transition from food dependence to food security. Food support was provided until there was evidence that the IDPs had built a solid base for their future livelihood security (*SCF PL 480 Title II Program Report, March 1998*).

In *Sierra Leone*, local authorities were involved in beneficiary verification which gave credence to the beneficiary identification process. It gave the local authorities a sense of recognition as important partners of *WVRD*. Although overall community participation was limited, this sense of recognition at the village leadership level made it possible for free stores to be provided at distribution centers, law and order to be maintained during distribution sessions, and the provision of free labor to assist with distribution (*WVRD annual report - March 1998*). It should be noted that this strategy may not work with positive results in all situations, for example, where there are ethnic conflicts and local authorities fail to recognize the needs of groups outside of their own ethnic group (e.g., Rwanda regional).

One of the issues addressed by implementing partners is gender and ethnic equity based on need. In emergency situations, implementing partners seek to provide assistance and training to refugee and displaced women and to ensure that direct access to services is provided. *WFP's* policy is to distribute food directly to households, and where possible, to the senior female in the household (*WFP report, Commitments for Women, 1996*). This policy has been applied in *Rwanda* where *WFP* programs focus on female-headed households for food distribution, nutrition interventions and food-for-work programs. *WFP* allocates 25 percent of its food-for-work resources to activities in which women have a direct stake in the assets the projects create. Projects include complementary support activities such as functional literacy, skills training, land acquisition, savings mechanisms and access to credit. Women are actively involved in the management of food deliveries with women comprising more than 50 percent

of all government commune supervisors paid by WFP. Women are active in all distribution committees. They are making decisions and organizing distribution schedules (*WFP Rwanda Country Office 1997 Report*).

In *Chad*, women were primary beneficiaries of the emergency food aid implemented by WFP. In a region where women are traditionally and culturally not visible in public, project implementers encountered initial strong resistance from traditional rules and authorities. However, existing cultural barriers were dissolved once the population was sensitized. Because women received food aid, most of it was consumed within the household (*WFP/Chad*).

**TABLE 9: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4, INDICATOR 2**

Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 2: <b>Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports, proposals, TA's. Verified by performance questionnaire	1996	(baseline year)	93%	
	1997	93%	<b>94%</b>	94%
Indicator Definition: Collaborating with local institutions defined as: (a) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from cooperating sponsors (b) Joint activities with local host entities (c ) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc.	1998	93%		93%
	1999	95%		95%
	2000	95%		95%
	2001	95%		95%

*Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs: Percent of Programs Collaborating with Local Institutions for Activity Results*

In fiscal year 1997, SO1 and its partners implemented programs reaching at least **11.5** million beneficiaries. The majority or **94 percent** of programs were implemented in partnership with local institutions. For example, in *Bosnia*, ARC's program strengthened the capacity of local

Red Crosses to manage food aid and its logistical network which helped them gain further respect in their communities. *CRS'* central program strategy is the participation of the community in the management of assistance through multi-ethnic working groups, and the promotion of self-reliance through the local production of bread. The working group builds the local community's capacity to correctly identify beneficiaries on an impartial basis and ensures gender and ethnic equity (*ARC/CRS Bosnia*).

WFP is a key partner and implementer of U.S. emergency food aid. It plays a crucial role in coordinating food aid activities with PVOs, NGOs, UN agencies, and other donors. It regularly assists other U.S. implementing partners by providing food loans, leading negotiations with local authorities, and in providing transportation. In *Angola*, the partnership between *WFP* and *SCF* utilized the relative advantages of each partners to create a low-cost and effective food distribution program. Although WFP's delivery of food to Moxico province was by air, this proved to be cheaper and safer than road transport as the Government of Angola subsidized the cost of the aviation fuel used by WFP. Without the "air bridge" provided by WFP, the delivery of food to Luena would have been nearly impossible in 1996 and early 1997 due to insecurity along the route (*SCF PL 480 Title II Program Report, March 1998*).

In the initial phases of the *WFP* program in *Uganda*, general food distribution and food-for-work activities were undertaken by indigenous NGOs. A "soup kitchen" fed one hot meal a day to over 2,000 pregnant and lactating mothers and children under the age of eight. The districts involved established their own district disaster management committees with which WFP worked closely to plan the general food distribution. Needs assessment were undertaken with local authorities and indigenous NGOs (*WFP/Uganda*).

**TABLE 10: INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4, INDICATOR 3**

Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs				
Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency				
Performance Indicator 3: <b>Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements</b>				
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual	Revised Targets *
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports. Verified by performance questionnaire.	1996	(baseline year)	17%	
	1997	25%	<b>26%</b>	26%
Indicator Definition: Reporting requirements: performance indicators outlined in results framework	1998	40%		26%
	1999	60%		30%
Comments: Measured by programs able to meet <u>all</u> reporting requirements, i.e., provided required reports (timeliness not included).  *Timeliness should be included in the future, i.e., reports provided within a selected number of days of EOP.	2000	80%		35%
	2001	80%		40%

*Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs: Percent of Cooperating Sponsors able to Meet Reporting Requirements*

**Twenty-six percent** of programs were able to meet all reporting requirements, as currently defined (see above table). **Thirty-four percent** of programs were able to meet some reporting requirements. Of the group able to meet all or some requirements, **62 percent** reported on achievements versus stated objectives (see Annex 4).

Throughout the reporting period, SO1 undertook activities to educate its implementing partners on USAID's management-for-results efforts, such as through the organization of workshops in Angola and Kenya, and in the U.S. The overall feedback received from PVOs was the need to establish clarity on its SO1 reporting requirements and develop more user-friendly reporting format and guidelines which not only sought quantitative but qualitative information as well. In response, SO1 distributed its *"PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting"* which will be reviewed and refined after preliminary use by implementing partners. A reporting questionnaire has been developed and tested to collect information for this R4. Based on this experience, this format was revised, and will be incorporated into the *"PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting."*

The majority of implementing partners work with or through local institutions. One of the challenges is to ensure that local groups understand the need for reports and for standards in reporting. For example, in the *ADRA's* program in *Bosnia*, the Local Pensioners Association undertake the distribution of food and assist in the selection of beneficiaries. Although training and meetings have been undertaken in each center, one of the constraints in program implementation remains the attitude that food is allocated to them and there is no need for reports or for meeting criteria set out for beneficiary selection (*ADRA/Bosnia*).

### PART III: STATUS OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

The achievement of the performance targets set forth in the Strategic Plan forms the basis of the "management contract" for the SO1 team. The status of this contract is focused on two levels: (a) SO1's commitment to its implementing partners and (b) SO1's "contract" with BHR Management.

SO1 demonstrated its commitment to "partnering" with emergency food aid implementers by hosting four workshops in Washington in an effort to explain the SO1 results framework and to discuss any related issues. Two field workshops were undertaken in Luanda, Angola and Nairobi, Kenya with the latter workshop focusing on Southern Sudan programs. The Nairobi workshop was conducted jointly with OFDA. Through these workshops, the SO1 team received valuable feedback on its performance indicators and how to streamline and standardize reporting requirements. In response to this feedback, both SO1 and OFDA developed standardized reporting formats for their implementing partners and worked with each other to ensure that the two sets of guidance were consistent. Further, the workshops demonstrated a need for a continuing information sharing effort with PVOs, WFP and USAID field missions due to the rapid turnover of PVO, WFP and USAID staff in the field. In sum, we must "regularize" our information collection and dissemination efforts if we want our implementing partners to institutionalize their preliminary results measurement and reporting activities.

The FY 1999 Management Contract between SO1 and BHR/Management has not produced the results we had anticipated. In particular, the last SO1 R4 provided strong justification for a minimum of three additional U.S. direct hire (USDH) positions to be phased in during fiscal years 1998-1999. SO1 was advised that as a result of the continued downward pressure on USDH positions agency-wide it was not possible to approve this request. It should be also noted that no other alternatives for acquiring the additional staff needed received serious consideration nor was any specific guidance provided as to which among the many priorities assigned might be eliminated. Neither was SO1 delegated the authority to determine which priorities could be eliminated.

FFP/Management had agreed during the FY 1999 R4 cycle to address SO1's staffing crisis as one of its top priorities. Since no progress has been made, the SO1 team must reiterate in this FY2000 R4 report the **critical** need to examine immediately its staff and financial resource requirements. Should a decision be made to only provide a portion of the resources required or to not provide the additional staff and financial resources required (as presented in Part IV: Resource Request), BHR Management's guidance would then be needed to identify which Intermediate Results to delete. Furthermore, a "straight lining" of staff and financial resources scenario would require BHR Management's agreement on specific guidelines and/or procedures to be used by the SO1 team when making decisions regarding which needy countries and/or vulnerable groups to support; which PVO proposals to consider for funding; and which currently undertaken actions to "shed." We need to caution, however,

that if the status quo approach is adopted (again) we can anticipate that our SO1 performance will not improve. This, in turn, would impact negatively on FFP's ability to provide Congress with accurate and timely emergency food aid results reports. BHR should also not overlook the likely possibility that a status quo approach could lead to negative fallout as politically influential PVOs bring their complaints regarding FFP's lack of responsiveness to the Hill.

Finally, we need to acknowledge that emergency food aid plays a major role in meeting the Humanitarian Response objectives set forth in the U.S. Strategic Plan for International Affairs (SPIA). In view of this and given that food aid is a highly visible and an immediate impact resource tool, the current limited staff and financial resources could eventually hamper the achievement of the Administration's SPIA foreign policy objectives. The latter -- along with increased PVO complaints to the Hill -- could not only jeopardize future Title II and Section 202 (e) funding levels but other USAID funding categories as well. If readers of this R4 believe that a reduction in Title II food aid is a remote possibility then we only need to take note of the dramatic decline in the Title I and Title III levels over the last three to four years.



#### PART IV: RESOURCE REQUEST

SO1 does not have the staff and financial resources required to fully accomplish its Strategic Objective (Critical food needs of targeted groups met) as measured by performance against the four Intermediate Result indicators in the results framework. Specifically, the lack of staff and financial resources limits FFP's ability to respond to emergencies, and in turn, may increase FFP's vulnerability to audits and investigations and leads to an increased number of complaints from implementing partners. Furthermore, the lack of resources has also impacted negatively on SO1's ability to install a standardized performance reporting system with a user-friendly data base.

SO1 has attempted to demonstrate in this R4 that the efficient and effective management of emergency food aid programs is achievable only if required the human and financial resources are provided. Specifically, SO1 cannot guarantee that emergency food commodities will be delivered in a timely manner to the most vulnerable groups nor can programs be redirected as necessary if the requested resources are not provided. Realistically, without additional resources, it will not be possible for the SO1 team to *maintain* or improve performance on Intermediate Result 2, Indicators 1 and 2: "Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages" and "Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt."

We would be remiss if we prepared a "no hope" R4 that envisioned a status quo. SO1, therefore, decided to submit an R4 based on the assumption that carefully articulated resource requirements will be examined and Management will not endorse a "business as usual, nothing can be done" position. In this vein, the SO1 team decided to not entertain the possibility of developing a plan on "how to do even less with less" or at best, how to "stand still." Instead, SO1 took a realistic -- but sobering -- look at complex emergency food needs worldwide and recognized the importance of food aid in achieving the U.S. humanitarian aid objectives as set forth in the SPIA.

It would be instructive if the resources requested in this R4 are examined within a Post-Cold War (increase in man-made emergencies), post-GATT (agreement to eliminate food commodity subsidies), and El Nino effect (increase in natural disasters) context. Despite the encouraging transition activities in countries such as Angola and Mozambique, and the reduction of refugees in the Rwanda/Burundi subregion, the demand for emergency food aid resources is likely to remain at the current level during fiscal years 1999-2001. This is due to the fact that while there will be reductions in programs for refugees and the internally displaced, there will also be new requirements for resettlement, demobilization and other post-relief programs. Further, the El Nino effect will continue to generate irregular and extreme weather patterns worldwide. As a result, FFP can anticipate an increased need for emergency food aid during FY 1999-FY2000. As this R4 was being written, SO1 learned that Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia are facing their worst drought in more than 50 years.

The aforementioned situation and resource constraints notwithstanding, we have made some

progress in improving our overall management of emergency food aid, but the list of what remains to be done is long. Specific areas that require improvement during FY 1998-FY2000 are:

1. **Improved monitoring and reporting and more precise targeting by implementing partners:** During FY 1998-99, SO1 wants to improve its performance monitoring and evaluation systems, work with OFDA in developing consistent guidelines for emergency relief requests, and (again with OFDA) field test a standardized performance reporting format for partners. During the performance measurement workshops and meetings held in FY 1997 and FY 1998, PVOs agreed to collect, analyze and compile data on targeted populations and track their nutritional status. However, PVOs and WFP now require significant follow-on technical and financial support to institutionalize their improved performance measurement and reporting systems (estimated cost is shown in Table 13, Item 3). Further, the SO1 team plans to collaborate more effectively with WFP in collecting data on vulnerable groups and expects to move toward an agreement with WFP on a reporting system that will be more responsive to USAID's performance reporting requirements. Although WFP has adopted a "standardized reports" policy, the policy has not yet been fully implemented and there is, therefore, still considerable room for further dialogue on this subject with WFP as well as other donors, particularly with the European Union. (NOTE: European Union representatives attended and were active participants in most of the performance measurement and reporting workshops organized by BHR over the last year.) In FY 1999 -- after improved monitoring and reporting systems are in place -- SO1 plans to give greater focus to improved targeting of food aid. Specifically, SO1 requests DA funding for up to three Child Survival Fellows to assist and advise the SO1 team and implementing partners in designing emergency food aid programs that more carefully target children and pregnant and lactating mothers.
2. **Establishment of database and improved performance tracking system:** In an effort to reduce the labor-intensity of the R4 data collection, analysis and reporting activities and to increase the reliability of the data, SO1 needs to establish a user-friendly database and performance monitoring system. The latter should reduce the time and effort required to compile information for performance reporting. It will also facilitate an on-going review of progress made. Continued refinement of the "*PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting*" and reporting formats is also needed, and DA-funded technical support will be required to do this. Finally, a system for continuous information dissemination and information exchange and dialogue with PVOs is a must.

3. **"Telling our story" to the U.S. public with greater effectiveness:** This R4, as well as the FY 1999 R4, contain an abundance of results and appealing human interest stories. During the balance of FY 1998 we plan to work with USAID/LPA and Food Aid Management (FAM -- a consortium of food aid PVOs) in getting these stories placed in appropriate newspapers, magazines and PVO newsletters. We have already discussed the aforementioned proposal with LPA and FAM and both are enthusiastic. This activity will require SO1 staff time, technical assistance from an institutional support contractor (included in cost estimates in Table 13, Item 1).

## Workforce Requirements

Current SO1 staff levels are woefully inadequate. In fiscal year 1996, \$400 million in Title II emergency food aid resources reached 11.3 million beneficiaries through 30 programs managed by eight implementing partners in 18 countries. In fiscal year 1997, with the same number of staff, \$404 million in Title II food aid was provided to 11.5 million people through 45 separate programs managed by nine implementing partners in 28 countries. Furthermore, considerable staff time has been devoted to new disasters caused by El Nino. All other offices in USAID and in the Department of State that are responsible for managing humanitarian aid programs have far better staff to program assistance levels than the SO1 team (see table below).

**TABLE 11: FFP/ER Staff to Program Ratios in Comparison With Other Offices**  
**Managing Humanitarian Assistance Programs**  
 (Figures Based on FY 1997 Approved Levels in Budget Documents)

OFFICE/AGENCY	PROGRAM LEVEL \$ millions	OE LEVELS \$000	STAFF LEVELS*
STATE/PRM	687	13,000.0	100
BHR/OFDA	165	240.5	87
BHR/OTI	25	35.8	28
BHR/FFP/ER	404	80.0	14**

\*Approved FY 1997 Staffing Levels in Washington and Overseas, Including PSCs

\*\*This is the expanded SO1 team, including six CBOs, management and support staff

The above table demonstrates that of the four USG humanitarian aid offices listed, SO1 has the most unfavorable program level to staff ratio:

OFFICE	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PER STAFF MEMBER
State/PRM	\$6.87
BHR/OFDA	\$1.90
BHR/OTI	\$0.90
BHR/FFP SO1	\$28.00

The above analysis suggests that the SO1 team should, at a minimum, have a staff that is nearly triple its current level of 14 (i.e., a staff of about 42). It is, admittedly, difficult to compare the level of complexity among the humanitarian relief programs carried out by the above four offices and to subsequently, make assumptions and reach conclusions about how much staff is required. That said, it is safe to say that the management of food aid operations is exceedingly complex and very labor-intensive. Many bilateral and multilateral donors and international PVOs are involved, and frequent consultations are required to determine needs accurately and avoid a duplication of effort. Furthermore, food aid to targeted groups requires coordination on the ground with partners and other donors, as well as with governments and businesses whose understanding and capacities to deal with humanitarian aid are not equal to the task.

As part of the FY2000 R4 process, SO1 requested it's institutional contractor, Mendez England, to examine SO1 procedures for reviewing and approving emergency proposals and to carry out a desk audit of the duties and responsibilities of a FFP/ER Country Program Officer (CBO). This review indicated that CBOs have a vast range of responsibilities and duties. For example, the CBO is a technical advisor, a project development advisor, grants manager, a commodity manager, an activity manager, a information/public relations officer and often, a monitoring and evaluation officer. Furthermore, unlike other USDH activity managers in USAID, the CBO is not supported by a controller, a program officer or a contracting officer. A summary of Mendez England's examination of SO1's review and approval process that may be found in Annex 1. In view of the above, SO1 is again requesting the following three additional USDH positions:

- ***One officer*** to manage and monitor emergency programs in Asia and the NIS. This is particularly important in view of the following recent developments: (a) the recent approval of a joint DA-Title II funded drought assistance program for Indonesia; (b) the probability that SO1 will receive additional requests for drought assistance from countries in South-East Asia, such as the Philippines; (b) the likelihood that North Korea will continue to be a major recipient of Title II food aid; (c) the recent BHR policy decision to permit Title II resources to be used in NIS countries; and (d) the Administration's peace initiative in Afghanistan.

- A **second officer** is needed to address a range of emergency feeding and food aid transition issues in Africa. This includes: (a) support for the Peace processes in Angola and Liberia; (b) increased management requirements for the complex program in Sierra Leone; (c) improving the targeting of food aid programs in Guinea as well as improving coordination among international organizations and PVOs working in Guinea; and (d) in concert with WFP, develop a post-drought program for the Sahel.
- In view of the many operational demands facing Food for Peace emergency food aid officers, there is also an urgent need for a **third officer** to coordinate SO1's results measurement and reporting exercise with OFDA, OTI, STATE/PRM and AFR/DRC. This coordination is essential for the achievement of Strategic Objective 1. To the extent that time is available, this officer will also assist in the review of emergency food aid requests and assist other CBOs accelerate the delivery of food aid to targeted beneficiaries

Clearly, SO1's staffing level is not adequate to keep abreast of Title II emergency food aid review and response actions. Although SO1 has tried to cope with the budget constraints, for example, by reallocating staff time from other Food for Peace divisions for the SO1 team, we are experiencing major adverse consequences as a result of the USAID's decision to maintain the current FFP office staffing level. This naturally contributes to "employee burnout" which is a major cause of increased staff turn-over. Further, there is an unwillingness for committed USAID officers to bid on positions in FFP/ER that are vacant or will soon be vacant. It is, therefore, recommended that Management actively engage M/HR in examining and addressing the full range of staffing constraints faced by the Office of Food for Peace, not just those being faced by FFP/ER, and in general, the SO1 team.

Inadequate FFP/ER country program backstop staffing levels have had an adverse impact on implementation of the U.S. Government's humanitarian aid policies. The General Accounting Office (GAO) strongly recommended that food aid management improvements are needed to achieve program objectives. It would be an unacceptable risk to not respond to this recommendation to effectively manage Title II emergency food aid -- a high impact, valued and highly visible U.S. resource that if not delivered to beneficiaries in a timely matter will generate considerable adverse publicity. Further, a recent assessment conducted on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative indicated that "while BHR/FFP and BHR/OFDA operating procedures are in many ways similar, with major programming decisions made in USAID/Washington, Missions *perceive* OFDA more favorably than FFP, because for the most part, it can respond in a timely fashion." (*Miller, in collaboration with USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Transitions Team, February 1998*).

In sum, SO1's staffing shortages became more apparent to the SO1 team during FY 1997 by the increased number of complaints from implementing partners and independent evaluations. Although comparisons suggest the need for a staff of 42 rather than 14, SO1 is requesting the following Washington-based positions:

1. An additional **three** USDH positions (if not available then three PSCs), phased in during

FY 1998-1999, and,

2. **Three** Child Survival Fellows, phased in during FY 1999-2000, to assist the SO1 team and implementing partners to more carefully target a greater portion of our limited Title II emergency food aid resources for children and pregnant and lactating mothers.

***Requirements for PSC Food Aid Monitor Positions in the Field***

The continuation of Title II program-funded PSC food aid monitors is required to manage food aid in Western and Eastern Africa. SO1 anticipates that major emergency food aid programs will continue in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Angola. Further, one PSC is needed in Nairobi to monitor the many emergency programs in the Greater Horn. It is also likely that one PSC will be required in Kabul to support the Administration's Afghanistan peace initiative. Finally, the ongoing and increasingly complex emergency food aid program in North Korea may require the assignment of a PSC food aid monitor to that country.

**Table 12: Title II-Funded Field PSC Position Requirements (SO1)**

PSC Positions	Planned levels		
	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000
Afghanistan	0.00	1	1
Angola	1	0.00	0.00
Greater Horn/Nairobi	0.00	1	1
Liberia	1	1	1
N. Korea (DPRK)	0.00	1	1
West & Central Africa	0	1	1
Rwanda	1	0.00	0.00
Total PSC Positions	3	6	6

### ***Requirements for Washington-based PSCs***

Three Washington-based PSCs to backstop emergency food aid programs are currently funded by OFDA. Although this OFDA support is important and is much appreciated, FFP cannot assume that OFDA will agree to funding additional PSCs or, for that matter, even agree to continue funding the current three PSC positions. Therefore, it is strongly urged that BHR Management immediately address this issue. The following options may be considered:

- (a) Request GC to examine if the notwithstanding clause in the PL480, Title II legislation extends to Washington-based PSCs who would be traveling more than 50 percent of the time, and, if so, to subsequently fund the current three OFDA-funded PSC positions as well as three additional PSC positions (particularly if an additional three USDH positions are not approved) under Title II; or
- (b) If legislative and/or current contracting procedures (unlike OFDA, FFP does not have its own contracting staff) preclude BHR/FFP from entering into contracts with PSCs with Title II funds it is then recommended that BHR/FFP request OFDA's contract staff to handle the negotiations using BHR/FFP DA funds as the fund cite. (Comment: If DA funds cannot be transferred to the IDA account or if the contracting office cannot handle the FFP/ER PSC contracting actions then we request BHR's controller and BHR's Management to recommend other workable options.)

**Consequences of not receiving funding for additional staff:** If the request for additional staffing is not addressed, BHR Management will need to provide guidance on which Intermediate Results should be eliminated and which emergency food actions or activities should be dropped. The most logical step would be to eliminate goals that are not realistically possible, that is, Intermediate Result 2 that seeks to improve performance in delivering food aid on schedule. Further, BHR Management can anticipate a further downward spiral in the SO1 team's responsiveness, an increased number of complaints from implementing partners, and an increase in audit and investigation vulnerability.

## Operating Expense Requirements

SO1 requires operating expenses (OE) for *basic* operations and USDH travel in order to: (a) respond quickly to emergency food aid requests; (b) coordinate more effectively with other bilateral donors, WFP, PVOs, and BHR/OHA/Rome; and, ( c) respond to queries from Congress and requests for information from other bureaus and offices. Essential activities such as site visits, travel for monitoring emergency activities, and training have been sporadic because of insufficient staffing and funding levels. If food aid is to be effective and impact on people's lives, especially if it is to be used in a way that increases people's self-sufficiency and “does no harm”, operating expense funds must be increased to an appropriate level. (Comment: Although the SO1 team cannot claim that any of its travel requests during FY 1997 were turned down due to lack of OE funding, SO1 is saying that it will naturally require additional OE funding if any request for three additional USDH officer is approved.)

Emergency food aid responses are often undertaken where there is little, if any, USAID field involvement, e.g., Guinea forest region, Chad pastoral lands, Ethiopia refugee camps, Congo forests, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Even when there is a USAID presence, missions often do not have humanitarian strategic objectives or emergency modifiers in their strategies. Financial and human resources are, therefore, usually not available for emergency responses. Further, “USAID's culture with respect to food (and other emergency) assistance remains an impediment to improved collaboration. Increasing numbers of officers need to be assigned to FFP (as well as OFDA and OTI). A number of “development purists”...are reluctant to devote attention and resources to relief assistance.” (*Miller, in collaboration with GHAI team, February 1998*)

These conditions result in the need for regular monitoring and review of food aid programs by the SO1 team. In order to "manage for results", USDH staff travel should allow for at least two visits per program per year. Further, since emergency food programs are more effective as part of multilateral responses, it is essential that regular consultations take place with our major partners: United Nations agencies including UNHCR and WFP; International Organizations including ICRC and IFRC; and the European Union.

For years, typical emergency food aid staff tools have been a grounding in logistics and commodity management. While these skills need to be maintained and expanded, the achievement of SO1 will require OE funding for the development of new skills and the repeated testing of new approaches and strategies on performance measurement in emergencies. To achieve any consistent skill levels in results measurements, considerable additional training efforts are needed. OE funds may be used to buy into to existing USAID contracts so SO1 team members can improve their monitoring and evaluation skills and participate in field workshops to reinforce their technical and management skills, including those of USAID missions.

**TABLE 13: Preliminary Budget FY 2000 FFP Development Assistance Requirements\***



DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TYPE	SO1 (Thousands of US dollars)
1. FFP Administrative Support Contract	878
2. Institutional Support Grants	1834
3. Technical Assistance and Training	500
4. Child Survival Fellows	450
5. Environmental Compliance (buy-in)	0.00
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	3662

\* Note: Since the SO1 and SO2 teams are submitting a consolidated budget and given that the review of the SO2 R4 is scheduled for submission three weeks after this SO1 R4, all budget figures presented are preliminary. Further, all the required budget tables for both SO1 and SO2 will accompany the SO2 R4.

## ANNEX 1

### JOB DESCRIPTION FOR FFP/ER COUNTRY BACKSTOP OFFICER (CBO)

#### PROPOSAL SUBMISSION

**CBO** must review all emergency food aid proposals and acknowledge receipt of proposal to PVO or to international organization (usually WFP but sometimes also IFRC and ICRC) within 2 days. **CBO** starts a Pending Request File that includes: a) the PVO or international organization proposal; b) mission concurrence cable; ( c) geographic and other bureau comments; c) FAO/WFP food needs assessment reports; (d) Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) reports; and (e) any previous performance evaluations completed on similar emergency food aid activities. **CBO** subsequently requests LINKAGES to review performance monitoring and evaluation plan in proposal and to provide comments. The **CBO** also provides Mendez England & Associates (MEA) with bi-weekly updates for the FFP/ER Proposal/Request Tracking sheet.

#### REVIEW, CLEARANCE AND APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

**CBO** requests and receives recommendations of USAID Mission or Embassy in-country and/or FFP field representative(s), and from the State Department/PRM and OFDA as necessary. **CBO** uses SO1 Emergency Checklist, and references ER Emergency Guidelines, ITSH Guidelines, TAP Guidelines, Strategic Plan, and relevant USAID policies to verify completeness of proposal; requests any revisions to proposal from PVO/WFP; and/or requests additional information and/or clarification from PVO/WFP. (NOTE: Proposal may be reviewed by other FFP staff, a USAID geographic bureau, OFDA, OTI or STATE/PRM when deemed necessary. It may be necessary for the **CBO** to prepare a summary sheet of the review of the proposal and organize and conduct a proposal review meeting. Mendez England & Associates (MEA) and LINKAGES assist in the analysis of the proposal. The **CBO** subsequently drafts an Action Memorandum and Transfer Authorization (TA) and requests Program Cost Sheet and TA number from BHR/FFP/POD.

The TA is the contract between the PVO/WFP and FFP, and will not cover the following categories in the proposal budget: any type of training, vehicles, miscellaneous, or other. Therefore, the **CBO** must ensure that these items are excluded from the budget, and the adjusted budget will be the working one.

The **CBO** creates an Action Package for clearance process which includes the following: a) Action Memo with attachments (Program Cost Sheet, Food Aid Statistics Sheet, and Approval of Authority Action Memo from AA/BHR); and b) TA with attachments (Proposal from PVO/WFP, relevant revisions/responses from PVO/WFP). **CBO** circulates Action Package for clearance. Clearance is required from: a) USAID Regional Bureau, OFDA/DRD, and PRM (if refugee related); b) FFP/POD Emergency Program Coordinator, POD Chief, ER Chief, FFP Deputy Director; and c) GC/ANE.

**If Action is rejected:** **CBO** must send a letter notifying PVO/WFP of reasons why proposal was not approved.

**If Action is approved:** After the proposal documents are cleared, **CBO** asks ER Secretary to fax TA to PVO for signature. PVO then faxes back a signed copy. The ER Secretary also sends hard copies of the approval letter with two original copies of the TA to the PVO. Original TAs must be signed by the PVO and sent back to FFP. (NOTE: In the case of WFP, a completed TA is e-mailed to FODAG, which forwards the TA to WFP for signature. WFP then returns a faxed copy and an original signed TA to FFP/W through FODAG. Subsequently, the FFP Director's Secretary gets TA for the Director to sign; ER Secretary faxes the signed TA to the PVO/FODAG, and mails signed originals to PVO/FODAG; the CBO informs POD that program is approved, so POD can process the Call Forward (for PVOs), or the Shipping Instructions (for WFP); and finally, the ER Secretary makes copies of the Action Memo and TA for all relevant parties: **CBO**, central file, USAID Regional Bureau, OFDA/DRD, GC/ANE, and STATE/PRM when appropriate.

**NOTE: The current FFP/ER results framework states that the review/clearance process should take no more than 21 working days upon receipt of complete proposal.**

#### **PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**

The **CBO** must monitor program achievements, including review of three types of reports: (a) quarterly Recipient Status Report (RSR), Commodity Status Reports (CSR), and Commodity Loss Status Reports (CLSR) against Regulation 11; (b) semi-annual progress/results reports against TA conditions and SO1; and (c) end-of-year FFP Emergencies Performance Review Questionnaire for reporting on results against SO1 program objectives, and inclusion of lessons learned, difficulties, and examples.

#### **REVISION/AMENDMENT OF FFP GRANT**

Review procedures for a Revision/Amendment to an existing FFP Grant are the same as for regular proposals, but **CBO** must remember to include language in the Action Memo and TA that explains the nature of the revision/amendment as it relates to the original proposal.

#### **COMPLETION OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES**

**CBO** provides disposition instructions, upon request, to PVO/WFP and follows procedures for grant closeout once all required documentation is received from PVO/WFP.

#### **CONDUCTING A REVIEW**

#### **SUDDEN ONSET, URGENT REQUEST**

If the proposal is a sudden onset, urgent request, does the proposal's program description briefly address the following in a manner that you can understand:

1. Location and nature of the emergency?
2. The proposed use of food: what and why?
3. Who the beneficiaries are?
4. The selection and size of rations for each use?
5. Time-sensitivity and duration?
6. How the food component will be implemented?
7. Tonnages, mix, in commodity request?
8. Transport (inland or ITSH) issues?
9. Budget request? Food aid and total program?
10. When commodities need to be distributed?
11. It "Fits" with an SO1 IR?
12. Monitoring ability and reporting?
13. Other programs which might duplicate or complement this activity?
14. Exit plan?

Has the SO1 Team:

1. Costed the commodities and transport?
2. Reviewed the budget and come to general conclusions as to appropriateness and allocability to Title II commodities?
3. Consulted with State/PRM, OFDA, or the regional bureau?
4. Settled any unresolved issues via fax or e-mail?
5. Identified and explained reporting requirements and performance indicators?
6. Determined how commodities will be borrowed or swapped, and repaid if necessary?
7. Determined if Bellmon is an issue, or if any waivers are appropriate?

<b>SLOW ONSET OR FOLLOW-ON REQUEST</b>
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**If it is a slow onset or follow-on to an existing program**, is there an operational plan which includes:

- a) A project description that defines:
  - ▶ Nature of emergency
  - ▶ How the food needs were determined
  - ▶ The intervention rationale(s)/IR fit
  - ▶ The target population/locations
  - ▶ Ration level and composition
  - ▶ Disincentive analysis (Bellmon)
  - ▶ Commodities requested
  - ▶ Commodity pipeline analysis

- ▶ Justification/request for swaps/repayment
  - ▶ Distribution plan(s)
  - ▶ Storage facilities/transportation logistics
  - ▶ Complementary program inputs
  - ▶ Exit strategy
- b) Monitoring/Reporting/Evaluation Section for:
- ▶ Performance indicators
  - ▶ Reporting on program progress
- c) A resource Requirements section which includes:
- ▶ A global budget (showing all resources)
  - ▶ ITSH Budget and pipeline analysis
  - ▶ Section 202(e) budget and pipeline analysis
  - ▶ Monetization plan/budget
  - ▶ Inland transportation budget (if landlocked)
  - ▶ Capital purchases/justification
  - ▶ Project organization/management

NOTE: The operational plan is not intended to be a "DAP" but it should be comprehensive enough so that we can measure any beneficial impact and know what the program will cost in new commodities and money.

## **ANNEX 2**

### **REVIEW OF FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997 RESULTS**

Table A outlines results obtained in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. The two results are not totally comparable due to refinement in methodology in collecting and analyzing data. The exercise conducted last year provided an overall, rapid assessment of what emergency food aid programs were undertaking. With the effort made this year to incorporate more rigor in data collection and analysis, there is more depth and specificity in the data obtained from implementing partners. Food for Peace intends to use collected data primarily for internal management and monitoring purposes, and will seek to improve the quality and specificity of data being collected. Thus, it views the management-for-results exercise as a continued learning process. And, further refinements are expected as efforts are made to incorporate rigor into definitions and analysis of indicators.

As presented in Table A, there were positive shifts in all performance indicators that remained constant in terms of indicator definition and analysis. These 6 indicators are: SO1 - Indicators 1 and 2; IR3 - Indicators 1 and 2; IR4 - Indicators 2 and 3. This may not be due to improvement in performance per se, as methodology used to collect information was different. With the current methodology where implementing partners were contacted specifically for data for the R4 report, the response rate for all questions were dramatically higher, and presumably more accurate.

There was more rigor applied this year in analyzing the remaining 4 performance indicators. These indicators are: IR1 - Indicators 1 and 2; IR2 - Indicators 1 and 2. Of these, there was a positive shift in IR1- Indicator 1. There were negative shifts in IR1 - Indicator 1 and IR2 - Indicator 1. A totally different methodology was used for IR2 - Indicator 2.

In reviewing performance tables dealing with emergencies, it is important that interpretation of quantitative data must be accompanied by “contextual” understanding, as progress and “success” is relative to continuous changing situations. This is illustrated in one case study presented in the section dealing with SO1, where reaching 8% of targeted groups was considered successful, compared to an earlier 79% result because of the changed circumstances.

**TABLE A: FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997 PERFORMANCE RESULTS**

<b>PERFORMANCE INDICATORS</b>	<b>FY1996</b>	<b>FY1997</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b>
SO1, #1: Percent of targeted population reached by food aid	67%	74.4%	No change in definition or analysis. Information verified by partners.
SO1, #2: Percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status of target groups	37%	62%	No change in definition or analysis. Information verified by partners. Further information obtained to identify programs with supporting data on nutritional status.
IR1, #1: Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting	53%	85%	No change in definition. Analysis included distinction between programs less than 6 months with those of longer duration.
IR1, #2: Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups	90%	67.5%	Analysis of “special needs” now focused on “nutritional” needs such as the malnourished, rather than on general food need. There is a problem in reporting on this, and efforts will be made to ensure that only special nutritional needs are reported.
IR2, #1: Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages	30%	33%	Definition changed to “food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsors and outlined in <b>FFP's</b> call forwards”. Methodology changed with information verified with data from FFPIS' shipping logistics status report, which was not undertaken last year.
IR2, #2: Percent of proposals reviewed & cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt	8%	37%	Definition and measurement changed from “calendar” to “business” days and excluded official holidays. Methodology changed with last year's information based on analysis by Mendez England. This year, actual calculations were undertaken of dates. Interval from date of proposal receipt to various benchmark events were analyzed which identified key obstacles/constraints to program approval process.
IR3, #1: Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development or relief exit strategies	63%	73%	No change in definition or analysis. More qualitative data collected to verify responses.
IR3, #2: Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (“do no harm”)	60%	91%	No change in definition or analysis. More qualitative data collected to verify responses.
IR4, #1: Percent of ISG grants supporting emergency planning and evaluation (measured as: % of programs utilizing ISG grants to support emergency planning and evaluation)	44%	DELETED	Deleted due to the difficulty in getting this data. ISG (now ISA) grants do not give breakdown of funding or activities by development and emergency activities.
IR4, #2: Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results	93%	94%	No change in definition or analysis.

IR4, #3: Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements	17%	26%	No change in definition or analysis. A significant amount of reports (ADRA, CRS, SCF, WVRD, WFP) were received after the questionnaire was sent to partners for verification -- the process helped to collect outstanding reports.
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# ANNEX 3

**TABLE B: TARGETED POPULATIONS REACHED IN FY 1997 (BY REGION, COUNTRY & PARTNERS)**

Country	Partner	Total Affected (program area)	Total Targeted	Total Reached	Total Not reached	Total No Info
I. AFRICA						
Angola	CARE	no info	106,275	103,294	2,981	-
	CRS	no info (shifted)	160,000	160,000 (reported: 188,000)	-	-
	SCF	no info	165,000	165,000 (reported:186,000)	-	-
	WFP	3,300,000 (UN 3/97)	315,000	207,280	107,720	-
Angola total	4 programs	<b>3,300,000</b> (incomplete data)	<b>746,275</b>	<b>635,574</b>	<b>110,701</b>	-
Chad	WFP	510,000	250,310	250,310 (reported:271,414)	-	-
Ethiopia	DPPC*	3,418,190	1,338,735	-	-	1,338,735
Kenya	WFP	1,600,000 (WFP)	895,718	895,718	-	-
Liberia	CRS	500,000	379,000	300,000	79,000	-
Madagascar	CRS	550,000	18,040	16,000	2,040	-
Mauritania	Doulos	150,769	17,745	17,745 (reported:18,939)	-	-
	WFP	200,000	200,000	200,000	-	-
Mauritania total	2 programs	<b>350,769</b> (incomplete data)	<b>217,745</b>	<b>217,745</b>	-	-
Niger	CRS	130,000 (Govt.)	63,000	63,000 (reported: 119,544)	-	-
Rwanda Regional (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, DRC, CAR, Uganda)	CRS	no info	4,000	4,000 (reported:5,000)	-	-

Country	Partner	Total Affected (program area)	Total Targeted	Total Reached	Total Not reached	Total No Info
	WFP	no info	1,763,000	1,763,000	-	-
Rwanda total	2 programs	no info	<b>1,767,000</b>	<b>1,767,000</b>	-	-
Sierra Leone	CARE	200,000	200,000	65,000	135,000	-
	CRS	950,000	292,000	231,000	61,000	-
	WVRD	no info	65,000	65,000 (reported:147,992)	-	-
Sierra Leone	3 programs	<b>1,150,000</b> (incomplete data)	<b>557,000</b>	<b>361,000</b>	<b>196,000</b>	-
Somalia	WFP*	196,770	196,770	-	-	196,770
Sudan	ADRA	500,000	105,600	56,000	49,600	-
	CRS	110,600	110,600	110,600	-	-
	NPA	200,000	107,000	107,000	-	-
	WFP*	no info	1,110,000	-	-	1,110,000
Sudan total	4 programs	<b>810,600</b> (incomplete data)	<b>1,433,200</b>	<b>273,600</b>	<b>49,600</b>	<b>1,110,000</b>
Uganda	WFP	367,000 (ICRC)	110,000	110,000 (reported:290,000)	-	-
I. AFRICA TOTAL	23 programs	12,883,329 (incomplete data)	7,972,793	4,889,947	437,341	2,645,505
II. ASIA & NEAR EAST						
Iraq	WFP	666,000	666,000	-	-	666,000
N. Korea	WFP (PVOs)	7,470,000	3,806,280	3,717,708	88,572	-

Country	Partner	Total Affected (program area)	Total Targeted	Total Reached	Total Not reached	Total No Info
II. ASIA & NEAR EAST TOTAL	2 programs	8,136,000 (incomplete data)	4,472,280	3,717,708	88,572	666,000
III. EUROPE						
Albania	WFP	565,000 (Labor & Social Asst. Ministry)	400,000	400,000 (reported: 625,000)	-	-
Bosnia	ADRA	45,000	47,500	38,798	8,702	
	ARC	no info	103,000	103,000	-	-
	CRS	no info	35,000 (average)	35,000 (reported:37,200)	-	-
	IOCC	no info	33,038	33,038	-	-
	WFP	no info	1,900,000	1,900,000	-	-
Bosnia total	5 programs	<b>45,000</b> (incomplete data)	<b>2,118,538</b>	<b>2,109,836</b>	<b>8,702</b>	
Bulgaria	ARC	500,000	100,000	97,000	3,000	-
	CRS	517,758 (UNDP 12/97)	20,000	20,000 (reported:23,483)	-	-
Bulgaria total	2 programs	<b>1,017,758</b>	<b>120,000</b>	<b>117,000</b>	<b>3,000</b>	-
Tajikistan	WFP	705,000 (overall)	485,000	355,000	130,000	-
III. EUROPE TOTAL	9 programs	2,332,758 (incomplete data)	3,123,538	2,981,836	141,702	
GRAND TOTAL	34 programs	23,352,087 (incomplete data)	15,568,611	11,589,491	667,615	3,311,505

Country	Partner	Total Affected (program area)	Total Targeted	Total Reached	Total Not reached	Total No Info
				74.4% of targeted	4.3% of targeted	21.3% of targeted

## ANNEX 4

**TABLE C: SUMMARY OF FY 1997 PERFORMANCE RESULTS - BY INDICATOR**

Table C.1

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met
Indicator #1: <b>Percent of targeted population reached by food aid *</b>
<p>RESULT: 74.4%</p> <p>Yes: 74.4%</p> <p>No: 4.3%</p> <p>No info: 21.3%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* See Table B for details on breakdown by region, country and implementing partner.</li> <li>Reflects total estimated population reached by programs. Based on documents available at FFP and verified by implementing partners by responding to FY97 performance survey questionnaire.</li> <li>This does not include beneficiaries targeted/reached by WFP's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) undertaken in Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan .</li> </ol>

Table C. 2

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met
Indicator #2: Change (or maintenance) in nutritional status of target groups (measured by percent of programs reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status)
<p>RESULT: 62%</p> <p>Yes: 62%</p> <p>No: 0</p> <p>No info: 38%</p> <p>Supporting data: Of those programs reporting to have contributed to change or maintenance in nutritional status, 71% have supporting data, i.e., 15 of 21 programs.</p> <p>Anecdotal: 2 programs (CRS/Rwanda - from monthly reports; N. Korea - PVO monitoring visit)</p> <p>Assumption: 1 program</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reflects percent of programs that <u>reported</u> to have contributed change (or maintenance) of nutritional status.</li> <li>Supporting data were not provided to FFP this fiscal year. In the future, supporting data will be provided and verified; and summary of results included in the R4.</li> <li>Nutrition surveys were conducted in Angola (MSF Belgium), Rwanda (international NGOs), Sierra Leone (ACF, MSF), Sudan (CRS - data provided in FFP/ER nutrition template on pilot-testing basis).</li> </ol>

Table C.3

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations	
Indicator #1: Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting	
<p>RESULT: 85%</p> <p>Yes: 85%</p> <p>No: 12%</p> <p>No info: 3%</p>	
Comments:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Measured by for programs of (a) 6 months or longer, undertook initial and follow-on needs assessments (b) less than 6 months, undertook initial assessment</li> <li>2. Primary and secondary data were used by programs.</li> </ol>

Table C.4

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations	
Indicator #2: Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups	
<p>RESULT: 67.5%</p> <p>Yes: 67.5%</p> <p>No: 17.5%</p> <p>No info: 15%</p> <p>Special groups targeted in order of frequency were: (Note: general food insecure - targeted by 17 programs)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Malnourished (general), pregnant/lactating women, elderly - note: <i>each</i> group targeted by 8 programs</li> <li>2. Children under 5, malnourished children under 5 - each group targeted by 6 programs</li> <li>3. Children (general) - targeted by 5 programs</li> <li>4. Malnourished children (no age), sick (hospitals, clinics), handicapped - each group targeted by 4 programs</li> <li>5. Orphans, widows &amp; female-headed households, preschool &amp; school children, unaccompanied children = each group targeted by 3 programs</li> <li>7. Prisoned children, women (general), malnourished women - each group by 1 program</li> </ol>	
Comments:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. "Special needs" measured to focus on nutritional needs, rather than on general food aid need (overall food insecure). Some reports did not distinguish, and efforts will be made to clarify this indicator. This should relate to nutritional needs which require special attention, e.g., for therapeutic or supplementary feeding.</li> </ol>

Table C.5

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule	
Indicator #1: Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages	
<p>RESULT: 33%</p> <p>Yes: 33%</p> <p>No: 67%</p> <p>No info: 0</p>	
Comments:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. “Pipeline shortages”: food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsors and outlined in FFP call-forwards. “Per schedule”: generally 4 months from date of FFP call-forwards.</li> <li>2. Information verified with data from FFPIS shipping logistics status report, which tracks food shipment., and bills of lading.</li> </ol>

Table C.6

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule	
Indicator #2: Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt	
<p>RESULT: 37%</p> <p>Yes: 37%</p> <p>No: 52%</p> <p>No info: 11%</p> <p>Of 18 programs not meeting the deadline, delays (more than 10 days) are due to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mission comments = 11 or 61%</li> <li>2. Clearance = 10 or 55%</li> <li>3. Response from CS = 4 or 22%; TA submission = 4 or 22%</li> <li>4. Issue paper to CS = 3 or 16%</li> </ol> <p>Of total 13 programs meeting the deadline, mission comments were received within 4 days = 8 or 61%</p> <p>Note: Of the 13 programs, 4 programs had “N/A” for mission comments. Thus, of the 9 programs requiring mission comments, 8 programs or 88% received comments within 4 days. Of the 8 programs for which comments were received within 4 days, comments were received before the proposal was received for 4 of the 8 programs, or 50%</p>	
Comments:	<p>Last year, used existing data and analysis provided by Mendez England. This year, analysis was undertaken from tracking data maintained by Mendez England. With better data available this year, time interval between benchmark dates identified the areas of delays (more than 10 days).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Date received</li> <li>2. Notice of receipt to CS. [To identify if this was area of delay, time interval reviewed = time from 1 to 2]</li> <li>3. Mission comments. [Time interval from 1 to 3]</li> <li>4. Issue paper to CS. [Time interval from 1 to 4]</li> <li>5. Response from CS on issues. [Time interval from 4 to 5]</li> <li>6. TA submitted for clearance. [Time interval from 3 or 5 (whichever is later) to 6]</li> <li>7. TA approval. [Time interval from 6 to 7]</li> <li>8. Notification and TA to CS. [Time interval from 1 to 8]</li> </ol>





Table C.7

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development
Indicator #1: Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development
<p>RESULT: 73%</p> <p>Yes: 73%</p> <p>No: 15%</p> <p>No info: 12%</p>
<p>Comment:</p> <p>Measured by programs that reported to have developed <u>and</u> implemented plans.</p>

Table C.8

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development
Indicator #2: Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food in program design and implementation (“do no harm”)
<p>RESULT: 91%</p> <p>Yes: 91%</p> <p>No: 0</p> <p>No info: 9%</p> <p>Criteria/areas most frequently addressed by programs:</p> <p>(a) an exit strategy which supports community stabilization = addressed by 21 programs or 62%</p> <p>(b) local capacity building, beneficiary participation = 27 or 79%</p> <p>(c) not undermining local agricultural production or local markets = 22 or 65%</p> <p>(d) integration with development assistance = 19 or 56%</p> <p>(e) gender and ethnic equity based on need = 18 or 53%</p> <p>(f) impartial and neutral distribution network = 23 or 68%</p> <p>(g) other = 3 or 9%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>1. Criteria for design and implementation, above (a) through (g) are those outlined in the strategic plan and results framework for IR3, indicator #2.</p> <p>2. Measured by programs that reported to have undertaken analysis <u>and</u> action(s).</p>

Table C.9

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs
*Indicator #2: Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results
<p>RESULT: 94%</p> <p>Yes: 94%</p> <p>No: 0</p> <p>No info: 6%</p> <p>Types of collaboration most frequently undertaken were:</p> <p>(a) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from CS =undertaken by 26 programs or 76%</p> <p>(b) Joint activities with local host entities = undertaken by 22 programs or 65%</p> <p>(c) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc. = undertaken by 28 programs or 82%</p> <p>Other: 11 or 32%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>*Note, indicator #1 has been deleted. It read: "Percent of Institutional Strengthening Grants (ISG) sporting emergency planning and evaluation." Since ISG are provided to provide overall support to CS (for both development and emergency programs), and reporting of ISG is not itemized by type of emergency, it was not feasible to determine what percent of ISG grants were used for emergency activities. Last year, this was analyzed by "percent of programs utilizing ISG grants for emergency planning and evaluation" but the information was difficult to extract from program documents.</p>

Table C.10

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs
Indicator #3: Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements
<p>RESULT: 26%</p> <p>Yes (all): 26%</p> <p>Yes (some): 34%</p> <p>No: 40%</p> <p>Of those programs who provided some or all reports (21 programs):</p> <p>Reported on achievements versus stated objectives (proposals, TA) = 13 or 62%</p> <p>No = 8 or 38%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. This was analyzed as percent of <i>programs</i> able to meet reporting requirements to be consistent with other indicators and to facilitate analysis.</li> <li>2. Timeliness was included, but should be included in the future to facilitate program monitoring by FFP/ER and R4 reporting.</li> </ol>



## ANNEX 5

**TABLE D: PROFILE OF TARGETED BENEFICIARIES AND ACTIVITIES**  
[See footnotes<sup>12</sup>]

COUNTRY	PVO WFP Local govt.	DURA- TION IN MONTHS	ACTIVITIES (TYPES)							BENEFICIARIES BY DISASTER GROUPS				VULNERABLE GROUPS (SUB-GROUPS OF DISASTER GROUPS)		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	IDPs	Refugees	Resettled Returns	Other	U5	Mal- nourished	Other
AFRICA																
Angola	CARE	12	x	x	-	-	x	x		37,334	-	3,188	F= 67,347	-	-	-
	CRS	12	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	16,700	-	120,000	F= 20,000	-	A = 2,000	A3+ E+ D+G= 18,000
	SCF	14	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	165,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
	WFP	4	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	315,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chad	WFP	3	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	I = 250,310	x	C	-
Ethiopia	DPPC	3	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F= 1,338,735	-	-	-

<sup>1</sup>Number of beneficiaries are based on estimates from available documents and partners. In some cases, numbers may not add up to total targeted population (Annex 3, Table B) due to difficulty in monitoring.

<sup>2</sup>Refugees:

This does not include refugees targeted by WFP's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan. Beneficiaries are estimated at **4,676,140**.

### Types of Activities:

1=General (free) distribution; 2 = Targeted distribution; 3 = Supplementary feeding; 4 = Therapeutic feeding; 5 = Food-for-Work; 6=Food-for-Agriculture; 7=Other, e.g., cash-for-work, monetization, monitoring, rehabilitation

### Vulnerable groups:

A=CHILDREN (general); A1=Preschool; A2=School; A3=Orphans; A4=Unaccompanied; A5=Prisoned  
B=WOMEN(general);B1=Pregnant/lactating; B2=Widows, household heads  
C=MALNOURISHED (general); C1=U5; C2=Children; C3=Women  
D=SICK (hospitals, clinics); E=ELDERLY; F=FOOD INSECURE; G=HANDICAPPED; H=TYPHOON/CYCLONE;  
I=DROUGHT/FAMINE

COUNTRY	PVO WFP Local govt.	DURA- TION IN MONTHS	ACTIVITIES (TYPES)							BENEFICIARIES BY DISASTER GROUPS				VULNERABLE GROUPS (SUB-GROUPS OF DISASTER GROUPS)		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	IDPs	Refugees	Resettled Returnees	Other	U5	Mal- nourished	Other
Kenya	WFP	6	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	I = 895,718	-	-	A2= 452,016 F =443,702
Liberia	CRS	12	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	60,000	-	275,000	F= 84,000	-	C+ C1= 60,000	-
Madagascar	CRS	6	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	H= 18,040	x	C+ C1= 18,040	-
Mauritania	Dou- los	6	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	I= 17,745	-	-	A, B,C, C2, C3
	WFP	8	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	I= 200,000	x 32,000		
Niger	CRS	2	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	I= 63,000	x	-	B1, E
Rwanda	CRS	15	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	4,000	-	-	-	-	C2= 1,902	A: A4=1,939 A5= 82 D=663 G=414
	WFP	12	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	245,000	658,000	760,000	-	-	C=100,000	A3, A4,D
Sierra Leone	CARE	12	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	200,000	-	-	-	-	C1	B1
	CRS	12	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	77,900	-	190,000	-	-	-	-
	WVRD	12	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	65,000	-	-	-	-
Somalia	WFP	7	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	F+I= 196,770	-	-	-
Sudan	ADRA	12	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	85,600	-	20,000	-	-	C2=49,600 A1=2,000 D=4,000	B1=20,000
	CRS	12	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	97,200	-	13,400	-	-	C2=1,600	B1 + A=3,750, E
	NPA	9	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	56,000	-	39,000	-	-	-	-
	WFP	12	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	1,110,000 (I+F)	-	-	I+F	-	C,C1	B1
Uganda	WFP	6	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	110,000	-	-	-	7,200	C1+B1= 8,000	B1=6,000 A4=1,500

COUNTRY	PVO WFP Local govt.	DURA- TION IN MONTHS	ACTIVITIES (TYPES)							BENEFICIARIES BY DISASTER GROUPS				VULNERABLE GROUPS (SUB-GROUPS OF DISASTER GROUPS)		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	IDPs	Refugees	Resettled Returnees	Other	U5	Mal- nourished	Other
ASIA & NEAR EAST																
Iraq	WFP	3	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	x	C1	B1,B2,D
N. Korea	WFP*	12	-	x	x	x	x	-	-				H + I = 3,806,280	x	C	A= 2,962,468 (includes A1,A2) F= 448,114; B1
	PVOs see WFP*	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	x							
EUROPE																
Albania	WFP	4	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F= 400,000			F
Bosnia	ADRA	12	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F= 47,500	-	-	E
	ARC	12	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F= 103,000	-	-	E
	CRS	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	35,000	-	-	-	-	-	F
	IOCC	12	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	33,038	-	-	-	-	F+C= 33,038	-
	WFP	12	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	1,900,000	-	-	-	-	-	A3, B2, E, G,
Bulgaria	ARC	9	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F= 100,000	-	-	E
	CRS	12	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	F = 20,000	-	-	F
Tajikistan	WFP	6	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	485,000	-	-	-	-		A3, B2,E,G
TOTAL	35									5,032,772 (not complete data)	658,000 (not complete data) Also see footnote 2	1,485,588 (not complete data)				

**Types of Activities Implemented:**

1 = General (free) distribution undertaken by 12 programs or 34% of programs

- 2 = Targeted distribution undertaken by 27 programs or 77% of programs
- 3 = Supplementary feeding undertaken by 14 programs or 40% of programs
- 4 = Therapeutic feeding undertaken by 13 programs or 37% of programs
- 5 = Food-for-work undertaken by 13 programs or 37% of programs
- 6 = Food-for-agriculture undertaken by 6 programs or 17% of programs
- 7 = Other - cash for work, monetization, monitoring, rehabilitation - undertaken by 5 programs or 14% of programs

## ANNEX 6

### ***Food Aid - Lifeline to People***

#### ***Human interest stories from emergency food aid programs...***

In early 1997, a young boy was admitted in the wet feeding center of Anna Sudan, a local NGO partner operating in El Salaam Camp, **Sudan**. He was severely malnourished, just bones covered with skin; he had fever and diarrhea. After the first week, the boy started to gain weight. Within three months, the boy became well-nourished and was discharged accordingly. The mother was extremely grateful. She recognized that it was the availability of food, provided by ADRA, which saved her boy's life. She changed the boy's name to "ADRA". Today, everybody calls the boy "ADRA". **ADRA, Sudan**

Santac Deva is 70 years old, and lives in Petrova Municipality, **Bosnia-Herzegovina**. She is a displaced person and she lives in a small, dilapidated house. Her husband died before the war and her two sons were killed during the war. The only income she is receiving is the disability pension which is irregular and insufficient, at about \$11 per month. She is in very poor health so she is unable to cultivate a garden or raise cattle. Because of her ill health, she is unable to collect the food rations herself, so her neighbors pick them up for her. Santac Deva believes that she would not be able to survive without these rations. She is very grateful for them. **IOCC, Bosnia**

The Town of Vratsa, **Bulgaria**, is located in the northwest part of the country. There is a high rate of unemployment due to factory closures as the economy privatized. One family participating in the Food for Peace program has both parents unemployed with four small children; the youngest are twins. The husband had a disabling accident that made him a paraplegic, in chronic pain, and no chance for work. The wife had her job terminated due to the privatization of a local factory. Most of the family income is for the medicine for the husband and meals for the twins. The father, mother, and older children can afford to eat only one meal a day. The bread ration of two loaves per day is an important supplement to this family. **CRS, Bulgaria**

The 116 young boys and girls gathered under a large tree in the hot sun are smiling, but their eyes betray their emotions. These children, between the ages of eight and nineteen, were abducted and held hostage by the Lord's Resistance Army in **Northern Uganda**. Some of the children were taken from their home at night, others from school or the fields where they worked with their families. They walked tremendous distances carrying heavy loads for the guerrillas; many were witnesses to or were forced to participate in killings of Ugandan civilians. Many were abused by their abductors. These lucky children (escapees) are now living in the WVRD trauma counseling center in Gulu, Uganda. They receive special counseling, medical care, feeding and vocational training. Title II emergency food is provided by the World Food Program (WFP). WVRD attempts to physically and mentally rehabilitate the children who are frequently severely malnourished. Once the children are able to leave the center, they receive a WFP food resettlement kit that is primarily composed of Title II commodities. **WVRD, WFP Uganda**



Without the emergency food aid provided by CRS, the 31 youngsters at the Orphanage Felicite-Marie in Butare, **Rwanda**, would have starved. The 31 were some of the many thousands of Rwandan children who were orphaned or separated from their families in the vast forests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) last year. When they arrived at the orphanage, most were gravely malnourished. With the support provided by CRS, this orphanage was able to take care of the children and restore them back to health. The youngsters, three to ten years in age, are especially fond of the corn-soy blend (CSB) to which they add sugar in order to make cookies that they bake with the help of the orphanage's care givers. **CRS, Rwanda**

#### **Remarks from PVO Monitoring Team to North Korea...**

"Most officials and all citizens were very appreciative of the food assistance and were willing to answer questions, open books and show the monitors almost everything. They were also extremely hospitable offering whatever food was available for lunch. Several times, they spread the table to such an extreme that it was almost embarrassing and there was no way to eat everything provided."

"Absolutely spontaneous visit with a father in his 40s. There are four people in his house working on the dike, but he was the only to receive the 2 kg ration. Others may have gotten the single ration on the site. He was appreciative." **Food-for-Work, North Pyongan/10, Ryonghon**

**Jiddo, Somalia:** Mud-splattered men hack down tangled grass and scoop up handfuls of muck, clearing a canal that will bring badly needed water to their farms. "We've lost our crops many seasons because of a lack of water," says Daud lidow Kuulow, a farmer who grows corn and sesame. "We talked several times about cleaning up the canal, but we didn't have enough food stored to stop farming." Now, for a day's work, lidow is earning \$6 worth of food: 2 and a quarter pounds of lentils, a pound of cooking oil, nearly 8 pounds of wheat. It's enough to feed his family of five, plus six relatives, for a day. Once the canal is usable again, irrigation -- the real bonus -- will enable lidow to double the size of his farm to 5 acres to better feed and support his extended family.

This small-scale, low-key, locally run project aimed at development rather than simple sustenance reflects a new approach to aid adopted by CARE and other humanitarian groups in Somalia and elsewhere. "Aid will happen, but we ought to do it right instead of doing it wrong," says Mary B. Anderson, an American economist whose study of aid and development led her to become a leading critic of traditional big-scale aid programs. She advocates that aid workers "do no harm," a policy named after a phrase taken from doctors' Hippocratic Oath.

The 1992 massive humanitarian and military rescue operation saved thousands of Somalis from starvation, but critics say the aid programs were ill-conceived. Now, the emphasis is on developing local skills. CARE offers workshops in social management and community development. All food is distributed quickly and quietly in exchange for work building canals, wells, reservoirs and other anti-drought projects. Already, the villagers have repaired twelve canals. **Excerpt from AP, April 4, 1998**

The Marist Sisters based in Kibali (Byumba), **Rwanda**, were approached in October 1997 by a small association of women. Many of the women were heads of their households and depended on charity for a large part of their livelihood. The women asked the Sisters to help them approach the local authorities to be allocated land. The local authorities agreed to provide a small plot of land to the 50 members of the association on the condition that the land is returned to constructive use. However, the land allocated was only three hectares and was located on a very steep slope. In order for the women to put the land to productive use, over 40 terraces needed construction.

It was at this time that the women's association came to WFP for assistance. WFP had already implemented projects through the Sisters and were, therefore, prepared to support the project. To complete the task of constructing the terraces, over 300 workers needed to be engaged. Due to the nature of the work, much of the labor needed to be done by able-bodied men. The association, together with the sous-prefect of Byumba (also, the chairman of the prefecture food committee) called together 50 people they considered vulnerable from the local population. 325 were elected to work on the project. By the end of March 1998, the last terraces were being completed, and the association was constructing a small office on their newly-renovated land. The first crop of Irishpotatoes had already been harvested, and beans were being sown on the terraces. The women opened a bank account for the association and all proceeds are jointly managed for the implementation of new ventures to improve the income of the association. The women no longer need the help of WFP. They will continue to grow crops without further assistance.

WFP provided 50 metric tons of food aid to this project. By sowing a combination of potatoes and climbing beans, the women's association will produce more than 50 metric tons of food from the land within 3 years. **WFP, Rwanda**

**RESOURCE REQUEST  
FOR FY 2000 R4**

**BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE  
OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE**

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 1 & 2**

**BHR/FFP**  
**Consolidated Resource Request for SO 1 and SO 2**

This document contains the following information:

- I        Workforce requirements for SO 1 and SO 2 for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. See Appendix A - G.
- II       Development Assistance Program Budget for SO 1 for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000. See Appendix H, I, and J. Development Assistance Program Budget for SO 2 for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. See Appendix K, L, and M.
- III      Operating Expense budget for Office of Food for Peace for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. See Appendix N.
- IV      P.L. 480, Title II, budget for fiscal years 1998, 1999 and 2000. See Appendix O.

Appendix A  
U.S. Direct Hire Workforce Requirements - SO 1

FFP/ Division	Position Description	% of Time for SO1 Team			Position is:	
		FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	Existing	New
FFP/D	Director	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Deputy Director	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Special Assistant	50%	50%	50%	X	
FFP/D	Grants Officer	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Secretary	50%	50%	50%	X	
FFP/D	Secretary	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Chief	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	PA (ER Coord)	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Analyst	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Budget Analyst	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Ops Specialist	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Ops Assistant	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Secretary	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/ER	FFP Officer	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/ER	Chief	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/ER	FFP Officers (4)	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/ER	FFP Officers (3)	0%	100%	<b>100%</b>		X

**Total Full Time Equivalency      13.0 16.0      16.0**

Appendix B  
US Direct Hire Workforce Requirements SO 2

FFP/ Division	Position Description	% of Time for SO2 Team			Position is:	
		FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	Existing	New
FFP/D	Director	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Deputy Director	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Special Assistant	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Grants Officer	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Secretary	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/D	Secretary	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/DP	Chief	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/DP	FFP Officers (5)	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/DP	FFP Officers (3)	0%	100%	<b>100%</b>		X
FFP/DP	Secretary	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Chief	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Analyst	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	PA (Dev Coord)	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Budget Analyst	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Ops Specialist	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Prog Ops Assistant	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
FFP/POD	Secretary	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	
BHR/PPE	Prog Analyst	50%	50%	<b>50%</b>	X	

**Total Full Time Equivalency      14.5                      17.5                      17.5**



Workforce

Org. <u>BHR/FFP</u> FY 1998 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	13	14.5						27.5							0	27.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	6							0							0	0
								6							0	6
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	19	14.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows





Workforce

Org. BHR/FFP FY 1999 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5						33.5							0	33.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	8							0							0	0
								8							0	8
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows	2	1						3							0	3

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. BHR/FFP FY 1999 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5						33.5							0	33.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	8							0							0	0
								8							0	8
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows	2	1						3							0	3

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows



Workforce

Org. <u>BHR/FFP</u> FY 2000 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5						33.5							0	33.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	8							8							0	8
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows	3	1						4							0	4

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. <u>BHR/FFP</u> FY 2000 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5						33.5							0	33.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	8							8							0	8
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows	3	1						4							0	4

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows



Workforce

Org.____BHR/FFP____ FY 2001 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5						33.5							0	33.5
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	8							8							0	8
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows	3	1						4							0	4

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Appendix G

Org. Summary On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
FY 1998:																
U.S. Direct Hire	13	14.5	0	0	0	0	0	27.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	13	14.5	0	0	0	0	0	27.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27.5
Program Funded	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 1998	19	14.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
FY 1999 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
Program Funded	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 1999 Target	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
FY 1999 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
Program Funded	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 1999 Request	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
FY 2000 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
Program Funded	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 2000 Target	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
FY 2000 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
Program Funded	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 2000 Request	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5
FY 2001 Estimate:																
U.S. Direct Hire	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staf	16	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	33.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.5
Program Funded	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 2000 Target	24	17.5	0	0	0	0	0	41.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41.5

## USAID FY 2000 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM/COUNTRY

Appendix H

29-Jul-98  
01:20 PMCountry/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

SO #1 Title: Meet critical food needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations.				FY 2000												Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 99	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 00	Est. Total Cost life of SO		
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	2,220	0	999	1,221	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,998		0	
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	1,480	370		0	0	1,110		0	0	0	0	1,332		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0									0				0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
Total Bilateral		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
Total Field Support		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		0	3,700	370	999	1,221	0	1,110	0	0	0	0	0				

<b>FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- DA</b>		
Econ Growth	2,220	
[Of which Microenterprise]		
HCD	370	
PHN	1,110	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

<b>FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- ESF</b>		
Econ Growth	0	
[Of which Microenterprise]		
HCD	0	
PHN	0	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0



## USAID FY 1999 Budget Request by Program/Country

29-Jul-98  
01:20 PMCountry/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # 1 , Title: Meet critical food needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations.				FY 1999												Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 98	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 99	Est. Total Cost life of SO		
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	1,608	0	720	888	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,447	0		
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	792	192		0	0	600	0	0	0	0	0	713	0		
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0									0				0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
Total Bilateral		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Total Field Support		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
TOTAL PROGRAM		0	2,400	192	720	888	0	600	0	0	0	0	0			0	

<b>FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- DA</b>		
Econ Growth	1,608	
[Of which Microenterpris		
HCD	192	
PHN	600	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

<b>FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- ESF</b>		
Econ Growth	0	
[Of which Microenterprise		
HCD	0	
PHN	0	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2001 Target Program Level  
FY 2002 Target Program Level  
FY 2003 Target Program Level

0  
0  
0

Program Funding

USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country

Appendix J

29-Jul-98  
01:20 PM

Country/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # 1, Title: Meet critical food needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations.				Estimated Total	FY 1998										Est. Total Cost life of SO	Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 97			Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 98		
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0												0	XX
	Total	0	1,630		0		1,630	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,467	0	
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0												0	XX
	Total	0	770		270		0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	800	0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0												0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0	0									0			0	XX
	Total	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
Total Bilateral		0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
Total Field Support		0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		0	2,400		270		1,630	0	500	0	0	0	0	0		<b>0</b>	

<b>FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- DA</b>	
Econ Growth	1,630
[Of which Microenterpris	0]
HCD	270
PHN	500
Environment	0
[Of which Biodiversity]	0]
Democracy	0
Humanitarian	0

<b>FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- ESF</b>	
Econ Growth	0
[Of which Microenterprise	0]
HCD	0
PHN	0
Environment	0
[Of which Biodiversity]	0]
Democracy	0
Humanitarian	0

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

## USAID FY 2000 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM/COUNTRY

Appendix K

29-Jul-98  
01:24 PMCountry/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # 2 , Title: Increase capabilities of FFP partners to effect and sustain access to food..				FY 2000												Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 99	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 00	Est. Total Cost life of SO		
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	3,780	0	1,701	2,079	0	0		0	0	0	0	3,402		0	
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	2,520	630		0	0	1,890		0	0	0	0	2,268		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0									0				0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						

<b>FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- DA</b>		
Econ Growth		3,780
[Of which Microenterpris		]
HCD		630
PHN		1,890
Environment		0
[Of which Biodiversity]		]
Democracy		0
Humanitarian		0

<b>FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- ESF</b>		
Econ Growth		0
[Of which Microenterprise		]
HCD		0
PHN		0
Environment		0
[Of which Biodiversity]		]
Democracy		0
Humanitarian		0

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

Program Funding

USAID FY 1999 Budget Request by Program/Country

Appendix L

29-Jul-98  
01:24 PM

Country/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # 2 , Title: Increase capabilities of FFP partners to effect and sustain access to food..				FY 1999												Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 98	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 99	Est. Total Cost life of SO		
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	2,412	0	1,080	1,332	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,171		0	
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	1,188	288		0	0	900	0	0	0	0	0	1,069		0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0									0				0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	XX
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
	Bilateral Field Spt		0													0	
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
Total Bilateral		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
Total Field Support		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		0	3,600	288	1,080	1,332	0	900	0	0	0	0	0			<b>0</b>	

FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- DA		
Econ Growth	2,412	
[Of which Microenterpris		
HCD	288	
PHN	900	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- ESF		
Econ Growth	0	
[Of which Microenterprise		
HCD	0	
PHN	0	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

Program Funding

USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country

Appendix M

29-Jul-98  
01:24 PM

Country/Program:  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # 2 , Title: Increase capabilities of FFP partners to effect and sustain access to food..																		Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
FY 1998																			
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 97	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 98	Est. Total Cost life of SO				
1 DA	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	2,700	0		2,700	0	0		0	0	0	0	2,430		0			
1 CD	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	900	400		0	0	500		0	0	0	0	800		0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0									0				0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral Field Spt	0	0													0	XX		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0								

<b>FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- DA</b>	
Econ Growth	2,700
[Of which Microenterpris	400
HCD	500
PHN	0
Environment	0
[Of which Biodiversity]	0
Democracy	0
Humanitarian	0

<b>FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- ESF</b>	
Econ Growth	0
[Of which Microenterprise	0
HCD	0
PHN	0
Environment	0
[Of which Biodiversity]	0
Democracy	0
Humanitarian	0

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

**OFFICE:** Office of Food for Peace (FFP)

29-Jul-98

1998	1999	1999	2000	2000	
ACTUAL	TARGET	REQUEST	TARGET	REQUEST	
60,000.0	72,000.0	84,000.0	72,000.0	84,000.0	
40000.0	80000.0	80000.0	80000.0	80000.0	
100000.0	48000.0	75000.0	48000.0	75000.0	
200000.0	200000.0	239000.0	200000.0	239000.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
15,000.0	18,000.0	25,000.0	18,000.0	26,500.0	
2,780.0	3,336.0	5,000.0	3,336.0	5,000.0	
17,780.0	21,336.0	30,000.0	21,336.0	31,500.0	0.0
7,425.0	8,910.0	10,840.0	8,910.0	14,850.0	
7,425.0	8,910.0	10,840.0	8,910.0	14,850.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
225,205.0	230,246.0	279,840.0	230,246.0	285,350.0	0.0

## Appendix O

### **P.L. 480, Title II Requirements**

	<b>FY 1998</b>	<b>FY 1999</b>	<b>FY 2000</b>
<b>P.L. 480 Title II</b>	<b>\$837.0 M</b>	<b>\$837.0 M</b>	<b>\$859.0 M</b>

Estimates of required Title II resources are derived annually through a formal collaborative process with Missions, and these estimates are included in the Congressional Presentation (CP). Although this process has not yet taken place for FY00, BHR/FFP expects to request approximately \$859.0 million in total P.L. 480, Title II funding for FY 00, which assumes a 3% increase above FY 99 levels. The increase is requested to support a great need for increased Section 202(e) grant funding. This need is described below.

The FY 99 CP allocation of Title II resources is as follows: \$63.6 million for SO 1 (PVO and WFP International Emergency Food Reserve activities); \$363 million for SO 2 (PVO development activities); \$155 million for WFP pledge (includes protracted relief operations and development pledge resources); \$28.0 million in support of Section 202(e) grants; \$9.9 million in support of the Farmer-to-Farmer activities under Title V of P.L. 480; and \$217.8 million is unallocated. With these levels of funding the 1.55 million metric tons for development activities may be accomplished.

### **P.L. 480, Title II, Section 202(e) Grants**

Through the Title II funds appropriated annually in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, \$28 million is awarded to FFP under Section 202(e) to support the field operations of food aid programs. \$10 million of these funds are earmarked for the World Food Programme and the remaining \$18 million are used to support development and emergency food aid activities. In FY98 BHR plans to award \$11.15 million of these 202(e) funds for development activities. Although not all TII development activities receive 202(e) funds and some have access to local currency through the monetization of commodities, it is safe to say that the average TII development activity receives approximately \$186,000 per year to support its field operations -- a level FFP has determined is inadequate to cover all CS staff salaries and expenses, travel, training and technical assistance, procurement of vehicles and equipment, commodity and financial management, activity monitoring and evaluation, overhead, and other critical field operations associated with food aid management. Thus, BHR/FFP requests that the level of 202(e) grant funds available for FY 00 be increased from \$28M to \$50M. Of the \$50M, \$10M would be for WFP activities, approximately \$26M would be used to support development activities and the remaining \$14M for emergency activities.